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This thesis attempts to study information content o f cash dividend and the 
relationship between cash dividend and ownership structure in China listed 
companies. 
In the first part, we test the information content o f cash dividend policy in China 
using event method. Empirical result shows: (1) After announcement o f a change in 
cash dividend, stock price not only changes in the same direction as cash dividend, 
but also in a certain proportion. (2) The change in cash dividend does not give 
information regarding the future earning ability of the related companies, but only 
gives the information about the company's earning in the current year. 
In the second part, we study the correlation between cash dividend per share and 
different shareholders' holding percentage using regression analysis. Empirical 
result shows that state-owned shareholders and legal entity shareholders prefer cash 
dividends; tradable shareholders prefer no cash dividends. However, this result 
seems inconsistent wi th our empirical research o f cash dividends' information 
content. Our explanation is that it is not cash dividend itself but the information 
content (current earnings in China case) of cash dividend influence share prices. We 
also use Logi t multiple regression model to analyze the phenomenon of "no cash 
dividend disbursements". Empirical result reveals that state-owned shares 
percentage and legal entity shares percentage are positively correlated with the 
probability o f distributing cash dividends. It indicates listed companies' cash 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Cash dividend is cash payment to shareholders. When a company distribute cash 
dividend, it reduces the l iquid assets and retains fewer resources for investment. 
Cash dividend policy has been generally referred to as the corporate decision o f 
whether to pay, when to pay and how much to pay. Nowadays, there are few easy 
answers to these questions, since there are many considerations involved in making 
cash dividend decisions. 
Issues concerning the question o f when to pay typically refer to the frequency o f 
cash dividend payment-whether annual, semiannual or quarterly. Most China listed 
companies only pay cash dividends on an annual basis. Very few China listed 
companies distribute semiannual cash dividend. 
Cash dividend payout process involves four dates: announcement date, record date, 
ex-dividend date and payment date. Announcement date is the date on which the 
board o f directors meets and declares the terms and t iming o f cash dividend 
payments. Record date is the date on which the f i rm compiles a list o f all current 
shareholders entitled to cash dividends. Ex-dividend date is the final stock trading 
date for entitlement to cash dividend. Last, payment date is the date on which the 
f i rm pay cash dividend to stockholders listed on the holder record date. 
Many factors influence the corporate decision regarding cash dividend distribution, 
such as tax, transaction cost, legal constraint, investment opportunities, availability 
of other fund sources, preference o f shareholders, asymmetric information, 
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principal-agency problem and the amount o f free cash f low. 
Western scholars have conducted a lot o f theoretical studies and empirical analyses 
and put forward various theories wi th different ideas. Wi th the exception o f those 
earliest works which examined whether cash dividend was relevant or not, almost all 
the rest o f them tried to determine which o f the factors posed above exert a 
significant impact on cash dividend policies. For instance, as investors are facing the 
problem o f asymmetric information, some researchers investigate how cash dividend 
plays the role o f conveying information about the corporate prospects by looking at 
stock price movements after the announcement of a change in cash dividend. 
Besides, some test whether cash dividend payout is an effective instrument to solve 
agency problem as paying out the remaining cash to outside shareholders can reduce 
the chance o f improper use o f money by insiders. 
Wi th in the literature, six dividend theories have been generated and have become 
the major theories o f this field. They are: (1) Dividend irrelevance theory, (2) 
Bird-in-the-hand theory, (3) Tax differentiation theory, (4) Clientele effect theory, (5) 
Signaling theory, and (6) Agency theory. 
This thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 is a literature review which summarizes 
the six major dividend policy theories. Chapter 3 is a general behavior study o f 
China listed companies' cash dividend policy. Chapter 4 is an empirical study o f 
cash dividend's information content in China. Chapter 5 is an empirical study o f the 
relationship between cash dividend and ownership structure. Chapter 6 gives the 
conclusion. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
Dividend irrelevance theory is proposed by Mi l le r and Modigl iani in 1961. I t argues 
that a f i rm's value or stock price is independent o f its dividend policy. This argument 
depends on some fundamental assumptions: no tax discrimination, information 
symmetry, transaction costs approaching zero, and independence o f investment 
decisions f rom financing behavior. However the assumptions mentioned above can 
not stand true in real world. Other scholars contend that the M M propositions are 
reasonable-given M M ' s restrictive assumptions-but that dividend policy becomes 
important once these assumptions are removed. 
Opposite to Mi l ler and Modigl iani 's irrelevance theory, Gordon (1962) argues that 
dividend policy is relevant because investors expose to higher risk o f receiving 
future capital gains than receiving current dividends. So investors prefer current 
dividend distribution to future capital gains. Nevertheless, Bhattacharya (1979) 
disagree and call Gordon's argument the bird-in-the-hand fallacy. He states that 
given the investment policy, a change in dividend policy affects neither the size o f 
the expected total return nor the degree of uncertainty about the total return. 
Considering the effect o f taxation, cash dividend is often a disadvantage compared 
wi th capital appreciation. Cash dividends are taxed at the ordinary income-tax rate, 
whereas capital gains are taxed at a lower rate. In addition, taxes on dividends are 
paid in the year in which the dividend is received while taxes on capital gains are 
deferred unti l the year o f sale. Thus to maximize shareholders' benefits, listed 
companies should not pay dividend or pay low dividend. However, this is not 
consistent wi th observable behavior of many listed companies' cash dividend policy, 
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what is called “Div idend Puzzle". 
Bird-in-hand theory, irrelevance theory and tax differentiation theory are three 
traditional theories in dividend policy: B I H stands for high payout o f cash dividend; 
M M thinks that dividend policy is irrelevant; TD proposes low payout o f cash 
dividend. 
Modern theories in dividend policy include tax clientele effect theory, signaling 
hypothesis and agency theory. 
Tax clientele effect theory is one o f prevailing explanations o f “Div idend Puzzle" 
and is a further development o f tax differentiation theory. It partly explains why 
some companies pay high dividend. It refers to the tendency o f investors to buy 
stock in f irms that have dividend policies meeting their preferences for high, low, or 
no dividends. Shareholders in high income tax brackets may prefer low dividends 
because o f the lower tax rates on capital gains income and the ability to defer taxes 
into the future. On the contrary, individuals and institutions in low income tax 
brackets may prefer high dividends to satisfy their cash demand. According to tax 
clientele effect theory, listed companies' any dividend policy cannot satisfy all 
investors' requirements. The group of investors who prefer new dividend policy w i l l 
be attracted to buy stocks; the group of investors who do not prefer new dividend 
policy w i l l sell out stocks. Once payouts of corporations conform to the desires o f 
stockholders and the market reaches equilibrium, no single f i rm can affect its market 
value by switching from one dividend strategy to another. So clientele effect theory 
in fact proves the irrelevance proposition. One of the most important empirical 
studies o f tax clientele effect is that of Elton and Gmber (1970). They use 
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ex-dividend day test to prove the existence o f clientele effect. They f ind that 
investors w i th higher return on cash dividend face lower marginal tax rate compared 
w i th investors w i th lower return on cash dividend. Moreover, companies w i th higher 
payout ratio attract more investors in lower tax rate. 
Dividend signaling theory or information content o f dividend argues that 
management, as an insider, is perceived as having access to more complete 
information about future profitabil ity than is available to investors outside the 
company. Div idend policy has been used to signal the inside information to outside. 
I f management expects that the company w i l l have good performance in terms o f 
future earnings increase, they w i l l increase cash dividend to signal such inside 
information to shareholders and potential investors. On the contrary, i f management 
predicts that the company w i l l have bad performance in terms o f future earnings 
decrease, they w i l l remain or lower cash dividend payout level that w i l l signal the 
expected bad performance to outside. So cash dividend should give information 
regarding the company's future earnings ability and affect stock price: stock price 
increases accompanied with cash dividend increase and stock price decreases 
accompanied wi th cash dividend decrease. Western literature hasn't reached 
consensus regarding the empirical result o f information content o f dividend. Pettit 
(1972), Aharony and Swary (1980), Kwan (1981), Asquith and Mul l ins (1983) etc. 
proves that dividend policy indeed deliver information to the market. However, 
Watts (1973), Gonedes (1978) etc. deny that dividend give information regarding 
future earnings ability. There are very few empirical studies on cash dividends' 
information content in China. Chen, Chen and Ni (1998)'s study on information 
content o f dividend initiation indicates that cash dividends has very weak 
information effect. Signaling theory of dividend is not contradictory wi th dividend 
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irrelevance theory as well. School o f signaling theory admits that at a given earnings 
level, dividend pol icy cannot change shareholders' income. Although it is thought 
that stock price changes accompanies wi th dividend changes, they argue that it is the 
informational content (about future earnings and growth opportunities) o f dividend 
policy influence share prices. 
Easterbrook (1984) have two agency-cost explanations o f dividends. The first one is 
the cost o f monitoring managers. Managers may pursue their own interest at the 
expense o f shareholders. The second one is risk aversion o f managers. They tend to 
select safe yet low expected return projects that contrast unfavorably wi th 
shareholders' preferences since shareholders wi th diversified portfol io would l ike 
managers to be risk-loving. However, i f managers acquire riskier ventures, 
bondholders would bear part o f the risk o f failure but they get no extra premium in 
return. Consequently, there is always a risk struggling among the managers, 
shareholders and bondholders. Agency theory holds that cash dividend distribution 
can lower agency cost efficiently in two ways. Firstly, paying cash dividends to 
shareholders can decrease free cash f low under manager's control. Management 
loses the resource for pursuing self benefits and such resource is reasonably 
allocated. Secondly, paying huge amount of cash dividends lower the possibility o f 
internal financing from retained earnings. To satisfy investment needs, the company 
has to seek equity or debt financing which force management to submit to intensive 
capital market monitoring and discipline. On the other hand, increasing dividends 
increases leverage, thus increases bondholders' default risk. In response to this threat 
to their interests, bondholders often write in specific covenants into bond agreements 
on dividend policy, restricting dividend payment, that often play a role in 
determining a f irm's dividend policy (Smith & Warner (1979) and Kalay (1982)). 
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Chapter 3 General Behavior Study on China Listed Firms' Cash 
Dividend Policy 
We have fo l lowing observations regarding China listed companies' cash dividend 
distribution behavior: 
3.1 Before year 2000, China listed companies in very high percentage did not 
pay cash dividends. 
Table 1 China Listed Companies' Cash Dividend (CD) Disbursements during 1992 
to 2002 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Pure CD 14 54 134 100 102 170 206 286 178 506 547 
o/o 26.42 29.51 46.05 30.96 19.25 22.82 24.21 30.95 16.78 44.39 45.17 
Combine CD 39 147 233 173 175 220 250 335 305 716 685 




o/o 73.58 80.33 80.07 53.56 33.02 29.53 29.38 36.26 28.75 62.8 56.56 
No CD 14 36 58 150 355 525 601 589 756 424 526 
o/o 26.4 19.67 19.93 46.44 66.98 70.47 70.62 63.74 71.25 37.19 43.44 
No. of listed 53 183 291 323 530 745 851 924 1061 1140 1211 
Source: Figure 1992 to 1999 is from processing statistics provided by Wei Gang (2001). Figure 2000 to 2002 is 
from processing data provided by CSMAR database. 
As Table 1 reveals, before 2000, very few companies disbursed cash dividends. The 
average percentage of listed companies in China paying pure cash dividend during 
1992 to 1999 is only 28.77% which is much lower than that in United States, which 
is 85%. 
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Most listed companies disbursed other types o f dividends accompanied w i th cash 
dividends such as stock dividends. Overall, there are in average 51.97% o f listed 
companies paid cash dividends before year 2000. 
Before year 2000, less and less companies distribute cash dividends. 
Non-distr ibuting companies amount to 50.2% in 1997, 56.99% in 1998 and 60.61% 
in 1999. Why many listed companies in China are not wi l l ing to distribute cash 
dividends? One o f possible reasons, we think, is the “insider control" phenomenon 
caused by unreasonable capital structure of most listed companies in China. Most 
China listed companies are restructured state-owned companies who are always 
controlled by state-owned shareholders (controll ing company, state-owned company, 
group, etc.). State-owned shareholders can decide the dividend policy beneficial for 
themselves even i f there are conflicts of interest between state-owned shareholders 
and tradable shareholders. 
We f ind that non-CD-distributing companies have the fol lowing characteristics: 
1. As earning increase, the percentage o f non-CD-distributing companies declines 
(refer to Table 2). However, many companies in good performance (EPS>0.4) 
still distribute no cash dividends (32.2% in year 1997, 33.14% in year 1998 and 
47.12% in year 1999). It indicates that, many listed companies do not distribute 
cash dividends even i f they have the ability to pay. 
Table 2. % of Non-CD-Distributing Companies with Different EPS Level 
" \ K P S <0 0-0.05 0.05-0.2 0.2-0.4 >0.4 
Year 
1997 100% 88% 66.4% 50.6% 32.2% 
1998 100% 87.1% 65.6% 54.3% 33.1% 
8 
1999 100% 81.6% 75.9% 51.4% 47.1% 
Source: After processing Chen (2000)''s statistics 
2. As Table 3 reveals, percentage o f non-CD-distributing companies is high wi th in 
stable performance companies (AEPS within -20%-20%). Percentage o f 
non-CD-distr ibuting companies is very low for companies in extraordinarily good 
performance (AEPS >20%) or companies in extraordinarily bad performance 
(AEPS <-20%). I t indicates that expectation of future earnings growth rate affect 
listed companies' cash dividend policy. 
Table 3 % o f Non-CD-Distr ibut ing Companies wi th Different Growth in Earnings 
Growth in <-20% -20%-0 0-10% 10%-20% >20% 
\ £ a m i n g s 
Year 
1998 2.74% 79.4% 36.7% 72.6% 2.86% 
1999 21.9% 83.3% 40.8% 78.5% 19.05% 
Source: same as Table 2. 
3 Non-CD-distr ibuting companies show some industry pattern. Percentage o f 
non-CD distributing companies in properties block is relatively high. However, 
the percentage is relatively low in commerce and utilities block (refer to Table 
4). 
Table 4. Percentage o f Non-CD-Distributing companies within Different Industry 
^ \ ^ d u s t r y Industrials Commerce Utilities Properties Conglomerates Finance 
Y e a r ^ ^ ^ 
1997 53.3% 47.7% 35.2% 59.3% 50.8% 
1998 59.2% 59.5% 48.6% 57.6% 62.6% 50% 
9 
1999 64.2% 54.7% 47.7% 61.8% 69.7% 51% 
Source: Same as Table 2. 
4. As share capital increase, percentage of non-CD-distributing companies decline 
(refer to Table 5). 
Table 5. Percentage o f Non-CD-Distr ibut ing companies wi th Different Share Capital 
Level 
Share <1 billion 1-2 billion 2-5 billion 5-8 billion >8 billion 
X ^ p i t a l 
Year 
1998 95% 62.4% 63.2% 59.7% 45.6% 
1999 100% 81.6% 75.9% 51.4% 47.1% 
Source: Same as Table 2. 
3.2 China listed companies' cash dividend disbursements showed staged 
tendency. 
As Figure 1 shows, from 1992 to 1994, more and more listed companies began to 
pay cash dividends. The reason behind, we think, is the immaturity o f stock market 
in China. During this period, most listed companies are restructured state-owned 
companies without good investment strategy. They do not know how to use financed 
money. So they end up distributing money to shareholders. 
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Figure 1. Percentage of CD Paying Companies 
From 1995 to 1996, cash dividend disbursements showed descending tendency. The 
reason is the central bank's contraction money pol icy in 1995. Most listed 
companies cannot get money f rom outside loan market, thus they had to decrease or 
omit cash dividend distribution. 
From 1997 to 1999, cash dividend disbursement again showed ascending tendency. 
One important reason is the central bank's cheap money pol icy f rom 1997 on. 
Another reason, we think, is China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)'s 
announcement of〈Notice on Rights Offering for Listed Companies〉 in 1996. ^ It 
requires that companies can apply for rights offering wi th higher than 10% return on 
net assets (RONA) in every recent 3 consecutive years. More restrict regulation is 
executed towards rights offering which is the cheapest f inancing method for most 
China listed companies〗. To get the qualification for rights offerings, companies 
1 Before the notice, listed companies can apply for rights offering when their averaged RONA in most recent 3 
consecutive years is higher than 10%. 
2 Wu (2003) and Hong Kong University Research Group for Finance in China's study reveals that listed 
companies in China have strong preference for equity financing. 
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wi th slightly lower than 10% RON A seek to increase RON A through cash dividend 
disbursements (refer to Table 6) ^ The strong evidence is the phenomenon o f 10% 
in China listed companies' R O N A during 1996 and 1997. ^ 
Table 6. Listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange wi th lower than 10% R O N A 
increase R O N A through CD disbursements (1997) 
Stock RONA CD per RONA Stock RONA CD per RONA 
Code before share after CD Code before CD share after CD 
CD 
600066 9.48% 0.6 10.5% 600095 9.21% 0.35 10.17% 
600109 9 .95% 0.05 10.27% 600110 8 .3% 0.74 10.02% 
600139 9.54% 0.4 10.2% 600605 9.83% 0.1 10.5% 
600612 9.83% 0.1 10.26% 600616 9.53% 0.184 10.38% 
600626 9.44% 0.1 10.02% 600631 9.32% 0.27 10.07% 
600655 9 .85% 0.1 10.09% 600668 9 .36% 0.1 10.02% 
600671 9.79% 0.1 10.06% 600692 9.32% 0.18 10.08% 
600697 9 .22% 0.25 10.13% 600779 9 .54% 0.125 10.15% 
600699 9.39% 0.25 10.15% 600812 9.18% 0.22 10.06% 
600827 9.65% 0.12 10.08% 600859 9.83% 0.3 10.05% 
600861 9.76% 0.12 10% 600878 9.465% 0.1 10.08% 
600880 9.56% 0.18 10.41% 600891 9.62% 0.175 10.03% 
Source: Lan (2000) 
Year 2001 is a breakthrough for cash dividends disbursements. Listed companies in 
China seldom pay cash dividend until the end of 2000, when CRSC requires that 
cash dividend should be considered when listed companies apply for refinancing. 
According to〈Instructions towards Issuing New Shares for Listed Companies〉by 
3 According to accounting rules in China, listed companies can deduct cash dividend payment in their 
calculation of net assets in the current year. As a result, cash dividend payment can decrease net assets and 
increase RONA that may help the company to reach the qualification for rights issue when their RONA is lower 
than the requirements. 
4 Refer to Jiang and Wei ,1998, Empirical Research of RONA, China Security Post, 1998-05-28, Wei 1998, 
Empirical Research of the Phenomenon of 10% in China Listed Companies' RONA, Shanghai Security Post, 
1998-06-06 
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CSRC in 2001，the Examination Committee w i l l pay more attention to listed 
companies' cash dividend pol icy in their recent 3 consecutive years, especially to the 
ratio o f cash dividend to distributable profits and the reason stated by the board o f 
directors for not distributing dividends. The policy affects some listed companies' 
earning distr ibution plan since the number o f companies paying cash dividends in 
2001 and 2002 boosted compared wi th prior years. 
3.3 Many listed companies distribute cash dividends accompanied with rights 
offerings. 
As Table 7 shows, many companies distribute cash dividends accompanied w i th 
rights offerings. 
Table 7. Listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange distributing CD 
accompanied w i th rights offerings (1997) 
Code Rights Offerings Cash Dividends 
Amioimcement Amount Amioimcement Amount 
day (10 thousands) day (10 thousands) 
600877 97/5/20 278.14 97/6/19 123.62 
600703 97/12/4 138.7 97/7/15 45.54 
600851 97/7/21 190.59 97/6/16 59.29 
600640 97/1/17 293.35 97/6/23 91.22 
600612 97/3/14 103.12 97/7/14 30.99 
600846 97/9/1 60.83 97/6/17 15.27 
600734 97/12/8 233.94 97/3/10 58.5 
600880 97/3/10 59.98 97/8/1 12.87 
600891 97/8/27 153.15 97/7/14 32.67 
600690 97/10/21 666.13 97/6/16 140.41 
600884 97/7/21 109.37 97/6/2 21.219 
600684 97/12/4 291.84 97/8/4 55.13 
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600830 97/1/17 85.17 97/7/10 ^ 
600701 97/7/16 175.5 97/6/5 ^ 
600810 97/7/7 360.36 97/7/2 ^ 
600834 97/8/27 191.1 97/7/2 32.76 
600820 97/1/20 108.7 97/6/19 
600643 97/1/15 350.06 97/6/9 
600894 97/7/23 549.6 97/6/23 ^ 
600849 97/3/14 69.21 97/6/9 ^ 
600844 97/7/11 128.28 97/8/26 1 6 ^ 
600859 97/9/3 429.88 97/5/6 50.54 
600654 97/5/21 125.58 97/8/26 13.66 
600893 97/12/11 332.77 97/7/23 34.87 
600710 97/8/4 144.38 97/6/25 
600896 97/8/29 225.05 97/6/11 20 
600873 97/7/22 156.59 97/7/15 
600639 97/7/24 658.8 97/6/17 48.8 
600887 97/6/27 204.67 97/6/9 
600655 97/9/3 364.6 97/6/9 ^ 
600899 97/8/6 209.03 97/7/17 11.07 
600717 97/12/4 894.03 97/5/19 25.14 
Source: Shanghai Security Post, Apr i l 1998. 
One o f the possible reasons is non-tradable shareholders' absolute control over listed 
companies. Non-tradable shareholders prefer cash dividends to capital gains because 
their shares are not allowed to be circulated to the secondary market t i l l now. After 
cash dividend disbursements, only tradable shareholders are obliged to be involved 
in external refinancing to compensate for cash outflow. The reason is that tradable 
shareholders may bear capital loss i f they abandon such "r ight" (stock price per 
share tend to decline fol lowing rights issue). On the contrary, non-tradable 
shareholders have the choice to give up such right while enjoying cash dividends 
because their cost o f shareholding is much lower than market value (equal t o ¥ l per 
share) and capital loss w i l l not affect their benefits. By asking the company to pay 
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cash dividend, controll ing shareholders encroach on tradable shareholders' benefits. 
Another reason is, as above mentioned, companies wi th slightly lower than 10% 
R O N A seek to get the qualification rights offering through cash dividend 
disbursements. One typical example is G U A N G G A N G (code; 600894) which 
disburse cash dividends accompanied with rights offerings in year 1997 and 
year 1998 under the pressure o f rights offerings qualification. 
However, this method w i l l increase financing cost due to taxation on cash dividends: 
Increase in financing cost= CD amount*(underwriting fee + 20% tax on cash 
dividends) / (Rights offering amount-CD amount) 
So it is very unreasonable to get qualification of rights offerings through cash 
dividend disbursements. 
3.4 China listed companies' cash dividend payout ratio is relatively low 
compared with other countries. 
Listed companies in other countries pay relatively high cash dividends out o f 
earnings (refer to Table 8). U S listed companies' CD payout ratio rank the highest 
which is around 50%. Compared with that in U S, listed companies in Japan and 
Korea pay relatively low ratio which is around 35%. 
Table 8 CD payout ratio in other countries 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
U.S 7 6 % 56.9% 46.6% 52.1% 50.1% 
15 
Germany 54.8% 50.1% 48.7% 41.2% 40.3% 
Japan 40.8% 32.4% 34.1% 32.4% 35% 
Korea 42.6% 32.7% 35% 38.2% 37.8% 
Source: Lan (2000) 
According to our statistics (refer to Table 9), CD payout ratio o f China listed 
companies is relatively low compared wi th other countries. One important reason is 
that more and more companies encounter losses or have very l i tt le profits these 
years. Due to their bad performance, many listed companies do not pay or have to 
lower total disbursements. Shanghai Securities Research Group found that listed 
companies' profitabil i ty decline over the listing period. In addition, many listed 
companies are state-owned companies who need huge fund for restructuring and 
development. 
Table 9 CD payout ratio in China 
Payout 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
ratio 
Shanghai 0.605 0.626 0.447 0.287 0.366 0.227 0.267 0.366 0.340 
Shenzhen 0.746 0.861 0.501 0.384 0.289 0.311 0.200 0.312 0.308 
Source: CSMAR trading database 
The other reason is that new regulation o f accounting policy in 2001 weakens 
distributable profits: More strict regulations are executed towards items included in 
income statement which may dilute distributable pro f i ts^ Applying the new 
accounting policy, many listed companies appear less profitable than before, thus 
5 The fiscal division of China published〈Accounting Rule for Enterprises regarding Fixed Assets〉 
in November 2001, which strictly requires depreciation of fixed assets to be included in income 
statement which may dilute distributable profits. These used to be a leak in Chinese accounting when 
dealing with depreciation. 
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their payment abil ity is lowered. 
Many listed companies announce cash dividends just in order to fu l f i l l the 
authorities' requirement towards refinancing qualification (〈Instructions towards 
Issuing New Shares for Listed Companies〉by CSRC in 2001). The authorities have 
not specified required payout ratio in related statements yet. Thus listed companies 
pay cash dividends as litt le as possible. The evidence is that many f irms only pay 
very low ratio cash dividend after year 2000. 70.45% of total extraordinary low cash 
dividend disbursements happen after year 2000 when the〈Instructions towards 
Issuing New Shares for Listed Companies〉was executed (refer to Table 10). 
Table 10 Extraordinary low cash dividend ratio during 1991 to 2002(equal or less 
than RMB0.05 per share) 
Range (RMB/share) Shanghai Stock Shenzhen Stock China 
Exchange Exchange 
0.01<=ratio<0.02 16 25 41 
0.02<=ratio<0.03 54 45 99 
0.03<=ratio<0.04 49 39 88 
0.04<=ratio<0.05 33 40 73 
Ratio=0.05 145 109 254 
Total (1991 to 2002) 297 ^ 
Total (2000 to 2002) 223 168 391 
% (2000 to 2002) 75.08% 65.12% 70.45% 
Source: CSMAR trading database 
3.5 China listed companies' dividend policy show high fluctuation. 
As Table 11 reveals, very few listed companies in China pay regular cash dividend 
during 1991 to 2002. It indicates that China listed companies do not take cash 
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dividend pol icy seriously and have short-term behavior in distributing cash 
dividends. 
Table 11 Regular cash dividend distributions in China listed companies (1991-2002) 
No. of CD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Above 
distributions IQ 
No. of listed 225 327 229 112 62 40 27 16 10 3 4 
companies 
Source: CSMAR database 
Many listed companies use stock dividends to compensate for inadequate cash 
dividend. Stock dividend do not involve cash outf low and just transfer undistributed 
earnings to stock capital. Many companies facing financial diff iculties choose stock 
dividend when they are unwi l l ing to cut dividends. 
Irregularity o f cash dividend policy in most listed companies lead to short-term 
investment behavior in capital market because investors cannot f ind a company wi th 
consistent high rate o f return in the long-term. According to statistics, shareholding 
turnover is very high in Chinese capital market (around 200%) compared wi th that 
in U S market (around 67%). 
3.6 Cash dividend often arouses intense conflicts between tradable and 
non-tradable shareholders. It may partly explain the irregular market reaction 
towards cash dividend announcement that is against previous literature 
suggestions. 
Non-tradable shareholders benefit much more from cash dividends than tradable 
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shareholders due to fo l lowing reasons: 
1. Non-tradable shareholders' cost o f shareholding is much lower than tradable 
shareholders'. Non-tradable shareholding cost equals to their face value, that is 
¥ 1 per share. However, tradable shareholding cost is determined by market 
price. As a result, tradable shareholders have quite low return on cash dividends 
compared wi th non-tradable shareholders, (refer to Table 12) 
2. After a f i rm's cash dividend disbursements, only tradable shareholders are 
obliged to be involved in external refinancing to compensate for cash outflow. 
The reason is that tradable shareholders may bear capital loss i f they abandon 
such “ r ight ” (stock price per share tend to decline fo l lowing rights issue). On the 
contrary, non-tradable shareholders have the choice to give up such right while 
enjoying cash dividend benefits because capital loss w i l l not affect their benefits. 
Table 12 Tradable shareholders' return on cash dividends 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Return on 0.88 5.5 6.21 1.60 1.59 2.94 1.74 0.91 1.05 1.07 
CD (%) 
before tax^ 
Source: Data for year 1993 to 1999 is from Wei(2001)^s statistics. Data for year 2000 and after is from CSMAR 
database. 
Separation o f tradable and non-tradable shareholders, non-tradable shareholders' 
absolute control sometimes leads to the phenomenon of barratry in cash dividend 
disbursement, which arouses literature attention in recent years. Some companies 
6 Return on CD is calculated as: ROCD= CD payout ratio/PE ratio 
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pay extraordinary high cash dividend out o f earnings whi le some companies pay 
cash dividends even i f they suffer losses in that year. One typical example o f such 
barratry in disbursement is Y O N G Y O U Software Co., Ltd, s cash dividend policy 
in 2001. Y O N G Y O U paid ¥ 0 . 6 per share in 2001 when its EPS was ¥ 0 . 7 per 
share. Unexpectedly the share price dropped to a great extent fo l lowing its 
announcement o f dividend policy. 
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Chapter 4 Empirical Study of Cash Dividends' Information Content 
The study o f dividend policy has just begun in China. 
In China, according to〈Personal Income Tax> (1993), cash dividends are taxed at 
20%. However, it is not strictly executed. Capital gains are not taxed yet. Investors 
in different income level are subject to the same tax brackets (20%) on cash 
dividend income. So, tax clientele effect theory may not be applicable to China case. 
Empirical study o f agency problem in China is very meaningful due to state 
shareholders' inside control. However, the study is restricted by l imited information 
release for agency problem's indicator from China listed companies. 
There are very few empirical studies on cash dividends' information content in 
China. Chen, Chen and N i (1998)'s study on information content o f dividend 
init iation indicates that cash dividends has very weak information effect. However, 
their study is based on cash dividend initiation which cannot represent the 
information effect o f cash dividends changes. In addition, we think their sample is 
too small to lead to such conclusion. 
Due to above reasons, in this part, we discuss the applicability o f signaling theory to 
China case. We empirically investigate whether cash dividend policy in China listed 
companies has information and what is the content. 
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4.1 Hypothesis 
The situation in China is so complicated that dividend theory based in relatively 
mature and regulated capital market may not be applicable to China listed 
companies. According to Dewenter and Warther (1997), the validity o f dividend 
information theory depends on two factors: existence o f information asymmetry 
between management and shareholders, and investors short-term investment 
behavior. Al though these two factors are very obvious in China, the applicability o f 
dividend information theory is in doubt. Even i f cash dividend announcements 
convey information to the market, what is conveyed may be quite different f rom 
other countries. In this part we investigate whether cash dividend announcement 
convey information to the markets. I f cash dividend announcement convey 
information, what is the information content? So we have fol lowing hypothesis to 
test. 
Hypothesis 1: Cash dividend announcements convey information and affect 
stock price. 
China capital market is not mature and regulated yet that scholars (Wu (1996), Wu 
& Huang (1997), Shen (1996)) think China capital market is not semi-strongly 
efficient. Even i f China capital market is not efficient, it should react towards public 
information, such as cash dividend announcement which is one o f the most 
important required public reports from listed companies. So we make the hypothesis 
that cash dividend announcement should bring about changes in stock price. 
I t has been empirically proved that cash dividend affects stock performance in 
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mature markets. However, why cash dividend policy causes stock price changes is 
still in dispute. Scholars in stand for signaling hypothesis think that it is not the cash 
dividend itself but the information content o f cash dividend influence share price. So 
we have the fo l lowing hypothesis: increases in cash dividend bring about share price 
appreciation and decreases in cash dividend bring about share price devaluation. 
Hypothesis 2: Changes in cash dividend do not give the information regarding 
the future earning ability of China listed companies. 
In U.S market, most listed companies try to maintain stable cash dividend (dividend 
smoothing). Changes in cash dividend are thought to convey some information to 
the market. An increase in dividends conveys a certain type o f information to the 
shareholders, such as an expectation of higher future earnings. Similarly, a cut in 
dividends may be viewed as conveying unfavorable information about the f irm's 
earnings prospects. However, managers in China listed companies do not tend to 
maintain stable cash dividend due to their ignorance of dividend policy. As a result, 
we suppose that changes in cash dividends provide no information about the 
company's future earning prospect. 
Hypothesis 3: Changes in cash dividend of China listed companies give 
information about the company's earning in the current year. 
According to〈Temporary Regulations on Corporations' Financial Management〉No. 
47 , the distribution o f profit after tax should comply with fol lowing order: 
1) cover the deficit; 
2) statutory surplus reserve retention; 
23 
3) public welfare fund retention; 
4) pay preferred dividend; 
5) discretionary revenue reserve; 
6) pay common stock dividend. 
No. 52 requires companies can not distribute cash dividend i f they have no profits. 
However, they can use surplus reserve to pay cash dividends not exceeding 6% o f 
share face value after covering the deficit with surplus reserve. So the fund needed 
for cash dividends in China listed companies is mainly from two sources: current 
earning and surplus reserve. Surplus reserve depends on retained earnings. 
Meanwhile, China listed companies seldom pay cash dividends out o f surplus 
reserve. So China listed companies' cash dividend policy (whether to pay, how much 
to pay) mainly depends on current earning. As a result, i f changes in cash dividend 
convey some information, the major content of information should be the company's 
current earnings. Moreover, L iu (1996)'s questionnaire for some listed companies 
reveals that current earnings are the most important determinant o f cash dividend 
policy (refer to Table 13). So we have the fol lowing hypothesis: the level o f cash 
dividend have close relationship with current earnings. 
Table 13 Determinant of China Listed Companies 
Order of Importance Factors influencing cash dividend policy 
1 Current earning 
2 Shareholders' requirement toward distribution 
3 Free cash 
4 To maintain stable cash dividend payout ratio 
5 Prediction of capital investment 
6 Maintain competitive return on cash dividends 
7 Cash dividend payment pattern 
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8 Other counterparts' cash dividend policy 
9 Maintain or increase share price 
10 Future earnings 
11 Changes in regulation and rules 
12 Asset/Liability Ratio 
13 Expected return on other investments 
14 Needs for repaying loan 
15 External financing cost 
Source: L i u (1996)'s〈About Cash Dividend Policy〉 
25 
4.2 Study Method Design 
4.2.1 Determination of cash dividend changes 
Changes in cash dividends include expected cash dividend change and unexpected 
cash dividend change. Expected change has no new information content, thus w i l l 
cause no change in share price. Unexpected change in cash dividend always has 
some information content which wi l l affect share price. We wi l l study unexpected 
cash dividend change in this part. 
Unexpected changes in cash dividend = Actual cash dividend — Expected cash 
dividend 
Several methods are widely used in literature for determining changes in unexpected 
cash dividend. 
1. Lintner Model 
Lintner (1956) think that changes in cash dividends depends on current earnings and 
last year's cash dividend. 
ADi,t = a 1+ Pi’tDi，t-i + (32,i Ei,t +Zi，t 
A D i , t : changes in cash dividend between year t and year t-1 
Di,t-1: cash dividend in year t-1 
Ei’t: earnings in year t 
Zi,t; unexpected changes in cash dividends in year t 
2. FB model 
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Based on Lintner's model, Fama & Babiak (1968) think changes in cash dividends 
are determined by the fo l lowing model. 
Di,t = PUDU-I + P2,i Ei,t + (33’i Ei,t-1 +Zi,t 
Ei,t-1: last year's earnings 
3. Growth Adjusted Model 
Expected CD = CD in year 0 * average growth in CD from year -5 to year -1. 
Unexpected changes in cash d iv idend: Actual CD — Expected CD 
4. Random Walk Model 
We think that Lintner model and FB model are not applicable to China case. In 
addition, since capital market in China has only 13 years' history, we cannot use 
growth adjusted model which requires long time series. So we have to use random 
walk model to determine unexpected changes in cash dividends. According to 
literature suggestion, this method is both simple and efficient. 
Given: 
Di,t = Di,t-i+ ADi,t 
I f A D i , t 〜 2 )， t h e n Expected CD in year t二 Expected CD in year t-1. 
Unexpected CD = Actual CD — Expected CD 
We also use random walk model to determine changes in earnings. 
4.2.2 Methodology for hypothesis 1. 
We study the effect of cash dividend on stock returns by means o f event study 
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method. We use cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to analyze share price changes 
around CD announcement day. 
Our samples are companies listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange before year 1995 
paying annual cash dividends (paying semiannual CD are excluded from our 
samples) during year 1995 to 2002. Listed companies wi th special treatment (ST) 
are excluded f rom our samples. 
The basis point is the announcement day o f cash dividends by board o f directors. 
According to〈Company Law〉 i n China, scheduled cash dividend disbursement 
announced f rom board o f directors should be subject to decision o f shareholders' 
meetings for off icial plan. There is a gap between scheduled cash dividend 
announcement day and the official cash dividend announcement day. However, most 
cash dividend schedules are proved after shareholders' meetings. So it is reasonable 
to pick the time of scheduled cash dividend announcement day to be the basis point 
o f our event period. For those observations with official announcements different 
f rom scheduled ones are excluded from our samples. As a result, we get 85 listed 
companies in our samples. 
The event window of our study is the announcement date, 30 trading days before the 
announcement date and 30 trading days after the announcement date. The estimation 
window, which we use to measure normal performance of stock returns, is from 
1995 to 2002 excluding the event period. We assume that stocks' risk (beta) stabilize 
during this period. 
We use market model to measure normal performance. For each o f sampled 
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companies, we run the fo l lowing regression over the estimation period: 
Ri^t: a ' l + 召 1 e M 
Ri, t is daily return o f stock i at t ime t where t lie wi th in estimation w indow. We use 
daily stock returns provided by C S M A R Trading database to stand for Ri,t. (refer to 
Appendix for further information) Rm,t: is daily market return at t ime t where t lie 
w i th in estimation window. We use return of Shanghai A share Index provided by 
C S M A R Trading database. 
We use Ordinary Least Square (OLS) to es t imate ai and pi. In all, there are 85 such 
regressions, one for each security, giving therefore 85 estimates o f ai and pi, which 
a . A 
we denote by i and., . 
Thus the abnormal return for the event period is: 
AR、t = - - A Rrcvt 
where ARi, t ; abnormal return o f stock i at time t where t lies wi th in T-30 and T+30 
Ri,t: daily return o f stock i at time t where t lies wi th in T-30 and T+30. We use 
daily stock returns provided by C S M A R Trading database to stand for Ri,t. 
Rm,t: daily market return at time t where t lies wi th in T-30 and T+30. We use 
return o f Shanghai A index provided by CSMAR Trading database. 
Thus the average abnormal return for grouped observations is: 
^ t = ¥ £ ARi^t 
where N is number o f observations in one grouped sample. 
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The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) surrounding the period o f t ime beginning k 
days before the announcement o f cash dividends and ending 1 days after the 
announcement is defined as: 
k 
We investigate market response to cash dividend changes by analyzing CAR 
tendency. We use chi-square statistics to test statistical significance o f positive 
correlation between changes in stock price and changes in cash dividends. 
Stock price not only changes in the same direction as cash dividends, but also in a 
certain proportion. We use t-statisties to test the statistical significance o f such 
proportionate relationship. 
4.2.3 Some Special Problems 
1). Information clustering problem 
According to regulations about information release in China listed companies, the 
scheduled earning distribution plan and annual financial report should be released at 
the same time. Thus there exists information clustering problem. To study the effect 
o f cash dividends on share price, we should control other affecting factors such as 
earnings. 
Referring to Pettit (1972)'s method, we group our samples into earnings increase 
group and earnings decrease group. 
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2) Effect o f surplus-converted stock and right offering on stock price 
Surplus-converted stock and right offering are very popular in China. Many listed 
companies announce cash dividend accompanied wi th these two plans. To rule out 
the effect o f these plans on stock price，we get rid o f observations accompanied wi th 
either o f these two plans and compare the result wi th what we f ind before the 
treatment. 
4.2.4 Methodology for hypothesis 2 
We use sign test and regression test to examine hypothesis 2. I f cash dividend give 
i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e c o m p a n y ' s f u t u r e e a r n i n g s , its n e x t y e a r ' s e a r n i n g wi l l 
increase fo l lowing this year's cash dividend increase and its next year's earning w i l l 
decrease fo l lowing this year's cash dividend decrease. So the sign o f earning 
changes in next year should agree with that of cash dividend changes this year. 
We use 2*2 chi-square statistics to test that earning changes in the same direction as 
cash dividends. We calculate the number of stocks according to the fo l lowing 2*2 
contingency table. 
Earnings increase in Earnings decrease in year Total 
year t+1 t+1 
CD increase in year t O i l 012 Rl=011+012 
CD decrease in year t 021 022 R2=021+022 
Total Cl=011+021 C2=012+022 n= 
011+012+021+022 
Where O i j represents the number of stocks satisfying conditions i and j. 
Furthermore, we run the fol lowing regression to test the correlation between changes 
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in cash dividend in year t and changes in earnings in year t+1: 
AEt+i 二 po+ p iADt 
where AEt+l denotes changes in earnings in year t+1, ADi denotes changes in CD in 
year t. 
4.2.5 Methodology for hypothesis 3 
We use sign test and regression test to examine hypothesis 3. The regression model 
is as fol lowing: 
ADt = po，+prA& 
Where ADt denote changes in cash dividend in year t, and AEt denote changes in 
earnings in year t. 
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4.3 Empirical Result 
4.3.1 Empirical Result for Hypothesis 1 
4.3.1.1 CAR analysis 
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for 30 days around the cash dividend 
a n n o u n c e m e n t d a y is a s f o l l o w i n g : 
Table 14 Abnormal Return (AR) and Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) around 
a n n o u n c e m e n t day . 
AD>0, AE>0 AD<0, AE>0 AD>0, AE<0 AD<0, AE<0 
chi- chi-
day AR CAR AR CAR AR CAR AR CAR 
square square 
T-30 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.00028 -0.0003 0.0035 -0.00565 -0.00565 -0.00208 -0.0021 0.195 
T-29 -0.0007 -0.0019 0.00148 0.0012 0.164 0.00392 -0.00173 0.00119 -0.0009 0.189 
T-28 -0.0013 -0.0032 0.00216 0.00336 0.273 0.00228 0.00055 -0.00012 -0.001 0.458 
T-27 0.00054 -0.0027 0.00159 0.00495 0.41 0.00178 0.00234 2.7E-05 -0.001 0.188 
T-26 -0.0018 -0.0044 -0.0013 0.00365 0.004 -0.0036 -0.00127 -0.00017 -0.0012 0.93 
T-25 0.00444 -2E-05 -0.0023 0.00135 0.029 -0.00014 -0.00113 -0.0009 -0.0021 0.284 
T-24 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.00247 -0.0011 0.083 0.00126 0.00013 3.6E-05 -0.002 0.149 
T-23 -0.0013 -0.0024 -0.00349 -0.0046 0.274 0.00185 0.00198 0.00315 0.00112 0.531 
T-22 0.00241 6.4E-05 0.00242 -0.0022 1.249 0.00594 0.00792 0.00122 0.00234 0.753 
T-21 0.00384 0.00391 -0.00225 -0.0044 0.411 0.00086 0.00878 0.00237 0.00471 0.149 
T-20 -0.0039 -2E-05 0.00504 0.0006 0.031 0.00317 0.01195 0.00121 0.00591 0.929 
T-19 0.00333 0.0033 0.00211 -0.0015 0.004 -0.00105 0.01091 -0.00089 0.00503 0.456 
T-18 -0.0035 0.00295 -0.00021 -0.0017 0.032 0.00108 0.01198 -0.00049 0.00454 0.002 
T-17 -0.0003 0.00269 0.00051 -0.0012 0.03 0.00112 0.0131 0.00039 0.00493 0.335 
T-16 -0.0014 0.00133 0.00394 0.00274 0.004 -0.00268 0.10412 -6.6E-05 0.00486 0.754 
T-15 0.00023 0.00156 0.00011 0.00284 0.276 -0.00457 0.00584 -0.00114 0.00372 0.084 
T-14 -0.0006 0.00096 0.0015 0.00435 0.274 0.00257 0.00841 0.00217 0.00589 0.009 
T-13 0.00581 0.00677 0.00112 0.00547 0.029 -0.00026 -0.00815 0.00021 0.0061 0.149 
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T-12 0.00243 0.0092 -0.00274 0.00273 0.164 0.00513 0.01328 -0.00052 0.00558 1.025 
T-11 -0.002 0.00723 0.00075 0.00347 0.087 0.00088 0.01416 0.00139 0.00697 0.84 
T-10 0.00021 0.00743 0.0016 0.00507 0.274 0.00381 0.01797 -0.00039 0.00659 0.114 
T-9 -0.0003 0.00713 0.00129 0.00636 1.229 0.00127 0.01924 0.00222 0.0088 0.282 
T-8 0.00242 0.00955 0.0019 0.00826 0.03 0.00613 0.02536 -0.00118 0.00762 0.233 
T-7 0.00018 0.00973 0.00135 0.00961 0.003 -0.00341 0.02196 0.00066 0.00828 0 
T-6 0.00286 0.01259 0.00638 0.01599 0.576 0.0025 0.02446 -0.00206 0.00622 0.021 
T-5 0.00372 0.01631 -0.00078 0.01521 0.288 0.00035 0.02482 0.00052 0.00674 0.753 
T-4 0.00378 0.02008 0.00402 0.01923 0.41 -0.0022 0.02262 -8.8E-05 0.00665 0.149 
T-3 0.00038 0.02046 0.00157 0.02079 2.15 -0.00257 0.02005 -0.00207 0.00458 1.025 
T-2 0.00183 0.02229 -0.00048 0.02031 0.273 -0.00199 0.01806 -0.00395 0.00063 2.237 
T-1 0.00933 0.03161 -0.00203 0.01827 0.165 -0.00143 0.01664-0.00674 -0.0061 2.847 
TO 0.00894 0.04055 -0.00086 0.01742 0.586 -0.00154 0.0151 -0.01538 -0.0215 4.656** 
T1 0.0049 0.04545 0.00117 0.01859 0.098 -0.00106 0.01404-0.00603 -0.0275 6.521*** 
T2 0.00046 0.04591 -0.00421 0.01438 0.037 -0.00383 0.01021 -0.00394 -0.0315 7.793**** 
T3 0.00065 0.04657 -0.00303 0.01135 0.302 0.00064 0.01085 -0.00264 -0.0341 6.793**** 
T4 -0.007 0.03961 0.00045 0.0118 0.195 0.00075 0.01159 -0.0022 -0.0363 5.661*** 
T5 0.00488 0.04449 0.00082 0.01262 0.632 0.0006 0.0122 7.7E-05 -0.0362 4.802** 
T6 -0.0012 0.04331 -0.0012 0.01142 0.005 0.00672 0.01892 -0.0009 -0.0371 4.656** 
T7 0.00056 0.04331 0.00531 0.01673 0.037 0.00059 0.01951 -0.00331 -0.0404 3.810* 
T8 0.00495 0.04882 0.00289 0.01962 0.189 0.0026 0.02211 -0.00094 -0.0414 3.109* 
T9 0.00038 0.0492 -0.00544 0.01418 0.101 -0.00079 0.02132 0.00212 -0.0392 3.109* 
T10 0.00127 0.05047 -0.00199 0.01219 0.302 0.00824 0.02956 -0.00178 -0.041 3.292* 
T11 0.00142 0.05189 -0.00222 0.00996 0.035 -0.00545 0.02411 -0.00026 -0.0413 3.292* 
T12 0.00262 0.05451 -0.00294 0.00702 0.302 0.00547 0.02957 0.00179 -0.0395 1.485 
T13 0.00273 0.05724 -0.00457 0.00245 0.824 -0.00439 0.02518 0.0009 -0.0386 1.161 
T14 -0.0003 0.05697 0.00253 0.00498 1.335 -0.0017 0.02348 -0.0006 -0.0392 0.973 
T15 0.00097 0.05794 -0.00039 0.00459 1.063 -0.00426 0.01923 -0.00217 -0.0414 0.955 
T16 0.00423 0.06217 -0.00862 -0.004 2.953* 0.00172 0.02094 -0.00059 -0.042 2.433 
T17 -0.0011 0.06109 0.00146 -0.0026 0.431 -0.01123 0.00972 -0.00052 -0.0425 1.61 
T18 -0.0029 0.05819 -0.00212 -0.0047 3.858* -0.0049 0.00481 -0.00204 -0.0445 2.433 
T19 0.0023 0.0605 0.00804 0.00336 0.002 0.00439 0.0092 -0.00273 -0.0473 1.485 
T20 0.00219 0.06269 -0.00153 0.00182 0.44 -0.00224 0.00696 0.00181 -0.0454 1.055 
T21 0.00257 0.06526 -0.00199 -0.0002 0.451 0.00109 0.00805 -0.00175 -0.0472 2.759 
T22 0.00435 0.06961 -0.00336 -0.0035 0.617 -0.00831 -0.00026 -0.00366 -0.0509 0.462 
T23 -0.0033 0.06634 0.0009 -0.0026 0.183 0.0021 0.00184 -0.00315 -0.054 0.398 
T24 9.1 E-05 0.06643 -0.00444 -0.0071 3.001* 0.00369 0.00552 -0.00402 -0.058 0.531 
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T25 -0.003 0.0634 0.00196 -0.0051 1.602 0.00042 0.00594 0.0007 -0.0573 0.685 
T26 -0.0005 0.06288 -0.00244 -0.0076 0.604 -0.0048 0.00114-0.00104 -0.0584 0.77 
T27 -0.0013 0.06156 -0.00414 -0.0117 0.44 -0.00503 -0.00389 -0.0008 -0.0592 1.161 
T28 -0.0003 0.06131 -0.00055 -0.0172 3.343* 0.00477 0.00087 -0.00628 -0.0655 1.389 
T29 0.00099 0.0623 -0.0005 -0.0177 2.52 -0.00215 -0.00128 -0.0065 -0.072 2.812* 
T30 0.00095 0.06325 -0.00424 -0.0219 2.89 -0.00235 -0.00363 -0.00117 -0.0731 2.641 
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For intuitive analysis, we draw Figure 2 according to column 3 and column 5 in the 
above table for earnings increase group. We find that within cash dividend increase 
subgroup, CAR slowly rises from T-10 on. There is a sudden increase in CAR in day 
0 to day 2. Growth rate in CAR remains stable from then on. Within subgroup of 
cash dividend decrease, there is a mini-increase in CAJR before the announcement 
day. After announcement day, CAR slowly decline and become negative from day 
T16on. 
The result is consistent with our hypothesis 1. It proves that changes in cash 
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dividends indeed convey some information to the market which could identify 
information content implied by different cash dividend plans. 
We draw Figure 3 according to column 7 and column 9 in the above table for 
e a r n i n g s d e c r e a s e g r o u p a n d g e t s imi l a r resu l t as f r o m earning i n c r e a s e g r o u p . 
Figure 3 CAR around CD announcement day (Earnings decrease group) 
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For ease o f analysis, we have fol lowing denotations: 
CD increase CD decrease 
Earnings increase Group 1 Group 2 
Earnings decrease Group 3 Group 4 
We f ind that CD increase results in CAR increase and CD decrease result in CAR 
decrease. However, within group 1 and group 4, the CAR tendency is more 
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consistent w i th our hypothesis. Wi th in group 3, there is only small rises in C A R 
compared w i t h group 1. Similarly, wi th in group 2, there is only small decline in 
C A R compared w i th group 4. It indicates that cash dividends convey informat ion to 
t h e m a r k e t a n d such i n f o r m a t i o n e f f ec t is i n f l u e n c e d b y c u r r e n t e a r n i n g s level . 
Div idend signaling theory argues that share price not only changes in the same 
direction as cash dividend, but also in a certain proportion. To prove this point, we 
further divide 4 groups into AD〉mean ^and AD<mean, resulting total 8 subgroups 
(refer to Figure 4 and Figure 5). For ease o f analysis, we have the fo l lowing 
denotations: 
C D t & CD t & CD 丄 & CD 丄 & 
i n c r e a s e > m e a n i n c r e a s e < m e a n d e c r e a s e > m e a n d e c r e a s e < m e a n 
Earnings | Group A Group B Group C Group D 
Earnings 丄 Group E Group F Group H Group G 
As Figure 4 and Figure 5 shows, CAR increases in groups A and E are larger than in 
groups B and F. Also, CAR decrease in groups D and G are larger than groups C and 
H. I t proves that share price changes not only in the same direction but also in a 
certain proportion as cash dividend. 
7 Mean of CD increase within group 1 is 0.1225 for group 1. Mean of CD decrease within group 2 is 
-0.12345. Mean of CD increase within group 3 is 0.113. Mean of CD decrease within group 4 is 
-0.14199. 
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F i g u r e 4 C A R f o r e a r n i n g s i n c r e a s e g r o u p 
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posit ive C A R ; stocks w i th announced cash dividend decrease get negative CAR. We 
calculate the number o f stocks according to the fo l lowing 2*2 contingency table for 
each event day, for earnings increase group and earnings decrease group, thus result 
in 122 such tables. The chi-square test result is shown in Table 14. 
CD increase ( j=l) CD decrease(j=2) Total 
AR is positive ( i= l ) O i l 012 Rl=011+012 
AR is negative (i=2) 021 022 R2=021+022 
Total C l :011+021 C2-012+022 n= 
011+012+021+022 
Where O i j represents the number of stocks satisfying conditions i and j . 
The expected number (which indicates that AR is independent o f CD) is calculated 
as fo l lowing: 
E i j= (R i *C j ) /n 
Since it is a 2 *2 chi-square test, we should use continuity adjusted chi-square. The 
con t i nu i t y a d j u s t e d c h i - s q u a r e s tat is t ics is ca lcu la ted as f o l l o w i n g : 
„ 2 2 (• O.. - E I -丄？ 
X^, = I I _ a _ _ ^ 
i=l j=l h.ij 
乂 j 、 X ^ 
When "“ 乂 ovi f \ we say that CD changes and AR show significant 
statistical correlation. 
From Table 14, we f ind that: within earnings increase group, there is significant 
statistical correlation between CD changes and AR in event day T16; wi th in 
earnings decrease group, there is very significant statistical correlation between CD 
8 a=0.1,0.05, 0.025,0.01； d f= 1 
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changes and AR from the announcement day to 11"' day fo l lowing To. It indicates 
that changes in cash dividends indeed convey information to the market that affect 
investors' investment behavior. 
Meanwhile, we notice that the significance of chi-square in earnings increase group 
is weaker than that in earnings decrease group. The reason is that information effect 
o f cash dividend is influenced by current earnings level. Good effect o f earnings 
increase outweigh bad effect of cash dividend decrease, thus many observations 
within earnings increase and cash dividends decrease group show negligible positive 
CAR. 
We now use t-statistics to test proportionate relationship between changes in cash 
dividends and changes in stock price. 
Ho： 
H i : (where | i i represent the of AD>mean group, ji2 represent the 以尺 
of AD<mean group) 
The result is shown in Table 15. 
Table 15 CAR and t-statistics for CD changes 
CAR Var(CAR) t-value P-value 
AD>0, AD>mean “ 0.070198 0.0026 8.23222 1.29E-13 
AE>0 AD<mean 0.013758 0.000267 
AD<0, AD>mean 0.005249 4.03E-05 1.20378 0.115522 
AE〉0 AD<mean 0.002003 0.000403 
AD〉0, AD>mean 0.022105 0.00027 6.22049 3.75E-09 
AE<0 AD<mean 0.00545 0.000167 
AD<0, AD>mean -0.01157 0.000502 4.79808 2.33e-06 
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" ^ < 0 丨 AD<mean | -0.03584 | 0.001058 | | 
When a=0.05, df=120, crit ical value o f t is 1.65765. As Table 15 shows, except the 
group o f AD<0 & AE>0, other groups' t-values are higher than crit ical value, 
rejecting the nul l hypothesis. I t indicates that changes in cash dividends and changes 
in stock price are proportionately correlated. 
4.3.1.3 After ruling out the effect of surplus-converted stock and right offering 
Figure 6 CAR for earnings increase group without surplus-converted stock and right offering 
observations 
CAR for earnings increase group without surplus-converted stock and right offering 
observations 
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Figure 7 CAR for earnings decrease group without surplus-converted stock and right offering 
observations 
CAR for earnings decrease group without surplus-converted stock and right offering 
observations 
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Our sample above includes some observations accompanied w i th surplus-converted 
stock and right offering. To rule out their effect, we get rid o f these observations. 
C A R for observations left is shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7. Compare Figure 6 w i th 
Figure 2, Figure 7 w i th Figure 3, we find that they show similar pattern and dif fer 
only in range o f CAR. Thus we conclude, even without surplus-converted stock plan 
and r ight o f fe r ing plan, cash dividend changes have signif icant effect on stock price. 
4.3.2 Empirical Result for Hypothesis 2 
4.3.2.1 Sign test 
We calculate the number o f stocks according to the fo l lowing 2*2 contingency table. 
42 
Table 16 cash dividend change in year t and earnings change in year t+1 
(t=1995,19%, 1997,1998,1999,2000,2001) 
Variables^ L + 、 . Total 
A E ^ A E ^ 
t+1 t+1 
“ ^ n i 110 
AD+ 
104 129 233 
AD； 
" r ^ t a l 143 200 343 
As Table 16 reveals, wi th in 110 cash dividend increase observations, only 39 
observations are accompanied with earnings increase in the next year. With in 233 
cash dividend decrease observations, 129 observations are accompanied wi th 
earnings decrease in the next year. The chi-square statistic for Table 16 is 2.591. 
When a=0.05, d f= l , the critical value of chi-square is 3.841. Because 2.591<3.841, 
we accept our hypothesis: change in cash dividend in year t is independent o f change 
in earnings in year t+1.In other words, change in cash dividend o f China listed 
c o m p a n i e s d o e s n o t g i v e i n f o r m a t i o n r e g a r d i n g f u t u r e e a r n i n g ab i l i ty o f t h e r e l a t e d 
companies. 
4.3.2.2 Regression test 
China listed companies' cash dividend changes cannot provide information 
regarding the companies' future earning ability. This result is inconsistent wi th most 
western literature suggestions. So we refer to Watts (1973)'s regression analysis for 
9 is increase in cash dividend in year t’ ad , is decrease in cash dividend in year t,么®,:, is 
increase in earnings in year t+1 and 〜】is decrease in earnings in year t+1. 
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further investigation. The regression result for AEt+i and ADt is as fo l lowing: 
Table 17 Regression result forAEt+i and ADt 
Variable Parameter estimate Standard error t value P value 
Intercept -0.04119 0.0009127 -4.512939 8.26E-Q6 
ADt -0.19506 0.059324 -3.287953 0.001092 
r=-0.1566;r-square=0.024 
So we have the fo l low ing regression model: 
AEt+i = -0.04119-0.19506ADt 
WhereAEt+i = Et+i - Et; ADt二D-Dt-i; t=1995, 2001; E is EPS and D is CD per 
share. 
According to statistic principle, i f AEt+i and ADi are not l inearly correlated, 
parameter estimate o f ADt should be equal to zero. Thus we have the fo l lowing 
hypothesis regarding parameter estimate o f ADt: 
HO: p i=0 
H I : p i邦 
From Table 17, t|3i=-3.288. When a=0.05, df=430, critical value o f t is -1.96. 
Because t(3l<-1.96, we reject null hypothesis. 
From above analysis, AEt+i and ADt are negatively correlated. This conclusion is 
o p p o s i t e t o s i g n a l i n g t heo ry : cash d i v i d e n d s i nc r ea se in th i s y e a r is a c c o m p a n i e d 
wi th earnings increase in the next year, cash dividends decrease in this year is 
accompanied wi th earnings decrease in the next year. However, since r is only 
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-0.1566, according to usual practice o f statistics丨(),we regard them as uncorrelated. 
As a result, we reach the conclusion that cash dividend changes cannot convey 
information regarding the company's future earning ability. 
4.3.3 Empirical Result for Hypothesis 3 
4.3.3.1 Sign test 
We calculate the number o f stocks according to the fo l lowing 2*2 contingency table. 
Table 18 cash dividend change in year t and earnings change in year t 
(t=1995,1996,1997,丨 998，1999,2000,2001, 2002) 
Variables + , ^ • Total 么 E. + ^E-
t t 
97 41 138 
A D + 
49 246 295 
AD； 
I b t a l 146 287 433 
As Table 18 reveals, within 138 cash dividend increase observations, 97 
observations are accompanied with earnings increase in the current year. With in 295 
cash dividend decrease observations, 246 observations are accompanied wi th 
earnings decrease in the current year. The chi-square statistic for Table 18 is 121.22. 
When a=0.05, d f= l , the critical value of chi-square is 3.841. Because 121.22 is 
much higher than 3.841, we reject our hypothesis: change in cash dividend in year t 
When |r|<0.3, AEt+l and ADt are regarded as uncorrelated, 
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is independent o f change in earnings in year t. In other words, change in cash 
dividend o f China listed companies does give information about the company's 
e a r n i n g in t h e c u r r e n t yea r . 
4.3.3.2 Regression test 
We run regression o f ADt on AEt for 576 observations. The regression result is as 
f o l l o w i n g : 
Table 19 Regression result for AEt and ADi 
Variable Parameter estimate Standard error t value P value 
Intercept -0.02231 0.005474 -4.07582 5.23E-05 
AEt 0.398831 0.029665 13.4445 5.1E-36 
r=-0.509375; r-square=0.259463 
So we have the fol lowing regression model; 
ADt--0.02231+0.398831 AEt 
Where AEt - Et - Et-i; ADt=D-Di-i; t=1995, . . 2002; E is EPS and D is CD per 
share . 
Similarly, we have the following hypothesis regarding parameter estimate o f AEt: 
HO： pr=o 
H i : p r 邦 
From Table 19, t(3r=13.445. When a=0.05, df=574, critical value of t is -1.96. 
Because tpl>-1.96, we reject null hypothesis. Regression test reveals that AEt and 
ADt are linearly and positively correlated. In addition, r is 0.509, according to usual 
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practice o f statistics^\ we regard AEt and ADt as linearly correlated in statistical 
significance. 
As a result, we reach the conclusion that China listed companies' cash dividend 
changes give information about companies' earning in the current year. 
11 When |r| ^0.5, AEt and ADt are regarded as correlated. 
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Chapter 5 Cash Dividend and Ownership Structure 
5.1 Issues Related to China Listed Companies' Ownership Structure 
Table 20 10 dominant shareholders' shareholding percentage in year 1999 ( A share 
companies only) (%) 
1st 3rd 4th 6 出 7 山 8 出 9 也 10 出 
M e a n 46.54 8.22 3.23 1.84 1.22 0.86 0.67 0.54 0.46 0.39 
Median 44.67 4.83 1.91 1.07 0.71 0.5 0.41 0.35 0.3 0.26 
Variance 879.89 112.89 13.05 4.62 1.91 0.92 0.56 0.33 0.23 0.17 
Min. 2.29 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Max. 88.58 41.26 24.75 16.7 11.86 6.7 4.9 4.78 3.82 3.48 
Observations 922 922 922 922 922 922 922 922 922 922 
Source: www.geinus.com.en 
From Table 20，we f ind that ownership structure in China listed companies is 
over-centralized. The dominant shareholders' shareholding percentage amounts to 
46.54% o f total shares, which is many more than shareholders' shareholding 
percentage. Even i f we add up all to 1〇山 dominant shareholders' shareholding 
percentage, they only account for around 17%. So the I't dominant shareholders 
h a v e a b s o l u t e con t ro l o v e r l is ted c o m p a n i e s ' v o t i n g power . 
Table 21 State-owned shareholders' shareholding percentage from 1993 to 1999 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Mean 0.33 0.34 0.38 0.36 0.32 0.27 0.28 
Median 0.38 0.36 0.42 0.39 0.33 0.25 0.26 
Variance 0.077 0.076 0.059 ().()64 ().()7() 0.070 0.075 
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Min. 0 0 0 0 0 0 _0 
Max. 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 
Observations 174 250 310 511 719 824 980 
Source: www.geinus.com.cn 
Table 22 Legal entity shareholders (wi th in borders)' shareholding percentage f rom 
1993 to 1999 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Mean 0.3 0.29 0.22 0.26 0.2 0.24 0.24 
Median 0.22 0.24 0.14 0.19 0.06 0.11 0.10 
Variance 0.066 0.063 0.051 0.063 0.062 0.072 0.072 
Min. 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max. 0.9 0.88 0.9 0.88 0.82 0.85 0.88 
Observations 174 250 309 511 719 824 990 
Source: www.geinus. com.cn 
From Table 21 and Table 22，although there is descending tendency in non-tradable 
shareholders' shareholding percentage (from 62% in 1993 to 51% in 1999), 
non-tradable shareholders still have exclusive control over China listed companies. 
In t ime series, state-owned shareholders' shareholding percentage decrease year by 
year and yet maintain at 32% level. According to Tian (1998)'s survey, only about 
6% listed companies in China have no state-owned shares. I t indicates that 
state-owned shares are controll ing shares o f China listed companies in a wide spread. 
Legal entity shareholders (within borders)、shareholding percentage is slightly 
lower than state-owned shareholders'. Its average figure during 1993 to 1999 is 25% 
and is s h o w i n g a s c e n d i n g t endency . 
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5.2 Empirical study of different shareholders' attitude towards cash dividends 
Most listed companies in China are restructured state-owned companies. Due to 
historical reasons, listed companies normally issue three kinds o f shares: 
state-owned shares, legal entity shares and tradable shares. Only tradable shares are 
allowed to be circulated in the secondary market t i l l now which accounts for only 
30% of all shares. From Table 20, dominant shareholders' direct shareholding 
percentage amounts to 46.54% which is much more than shareholders' 
shareholding percentage which is 8.22%. I f dominant shareholders' indirect 
shareholding is considered, such difference wi l l be even larger. Within state-owned 
shares (legal entity shares) controlled companies, state-owned shareholders (legal 
entity shareholders) control listed companies' important strategy through entrusting 
senior management. Although dominant shareholders' holding percentage is 
46.54%, their representative percentage in board of directors amounts to 70.49%. So, 
compared wi th other shareholders,广 dominant shareholders have absolute control 
over China listed companies. They may choose cash dividend policy beneficial for 
themselves, even i f there are conflicts of interests between different shareholders. 
Different shareholders have different investment costs. Non-tradable shares are 
priced much lower than tradable shares (Non-tradable shares' price equal to their 
face value, that is ¥ 1 per share). So state-owned shareholders' returns on cash 
dividends are much higher than tradable shareholders' returns. Moreover, 
state-owned s h a r e s a r e no t a l l owed to be c i r cu la t ed in t he s e c o n d a r y market t i l l now, 
thus state-owned shareholders cannot enjoy capital gains. 
Due to special characteristics of non-tradable shares, we have the fol lowing 
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hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: non-tradable shareholders (state-owned shareholders and legal 
entity shareholders) prefer cash dividends to capital gains. 
From our observations, China listed companies pay very low level cash dividends. 
In addition, tradable shareholders face higher investment costs and lower return on 
cash dividends. According to our statistics, average D/P ratio for the period during 
1993 to 1999 is only 2.92% which is slightly higher than 1-year interest rate (2.25%) 
on fixed deposit. I f 20% taxation is considered, the residual received by t radable 
shareholders is only 2.34%. 
Moreover, China capital market lacks systematic law and regulations due to its short 
development history. Inside trading and government behavior have significant 
influences on the market. There are lots of individual investors and few institutional 
investors. The atmosphere of arbitrage is very obvious in China stock market. Stock 
price fluctuates a lot, thus investors face quite high risk in stock investments. Many 
individual investors show blindness in their investment behavior and fol low majority. 
Irregularity o f cash dividend policy in most listed companies lead to short-term 
investment behavior in capital market because investors cannot find a company wi th 
consistent high rate of return in the long-term. According to statistics, shareholding 
turnover is very high in Chinese capital market (around 200%) compared with that 
in U.S market (around 67%). As a result, investors may not value long-term return 
(cash dividend) but only short-term capital gain. So we have the fol lowing 
hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 2: tradable shares percentage is negatively correlated with cash 
dividend distribution level. 
We run the fol lowing multiple regression to test hypothesis 1 and 2 over period 1995 
to 2002. Although year 2000 regulation by CSRC^^ affected some listed companies' 
earning distribution behavior, we predict that such relationship still holds after year 
2000. Our reason is that authorities have not specified required payout ratio in 
related statements yet. Listed companies who do not prefer paying cash dividends 
can pay cash dividends as little as possible to reach the qualification o f equity 
financing. As a result, tradable shareholding percentage should be negatively 
c o r r e l a t e d w i t h c a s h d i v i d e n d a f t e r y e a r 2 0 0 0 as wel l . 
CDPS^^ = a- 4- ；^SOSih +.巧LESit + ^ L C A S R ^ 
+ y ^ M E B T ^ ^ + S . ^ L S J Z K ^ + P ^ S ^ 十 “ 
The definition of respective variables in the above regression model is shown in the 
fol lowing Table. 
Table 23 Definit ion of variables in the regression model 
Variable Expected Definition 
^ 
Dependent CDPS Cash dividend per share 
Var 
Explanatory SOS - % of state-owned shares 
Var LES - % of legal entity shares (within borders) 
TS + % of tradable A shares 
LCASH + Common logarithm of monetary fund 
LDP + Natural logarithm of distributable profits 
】2〈Instructions towards Issuing New Shares for Listed Companies〉(2001) 
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L D E B T + Common logarithm o f debt balance 
LS IZE + Common logarithm o f total assets ( we use 
total assets to measure size) 
EPS + Earning per share 
In our model, cash dividend per share is our dependent variable. We use OLS to 
estimate the set o f parameters. As above mentioned, state-owned shares percentage, 
legal entity shares percentage and tradable shares percentage may affect cash 
dividend level. We also include monetary fund into our explanatory variables 
because cash dividend distribution bring about cash outflow, we think L C A S H 
should be positively correlated with CDPS. Generally speaking, more distributable 
profits listed companies have, higher probability of distributing cash dividends. So 
we expect that LDP and CDPS should be positively correlated. Similarly, current 
EPS should be positively correlated with CDPS. We include debt balance into our 
explanatory variables because some companies distribute cash dividend 
accompanied wi th debt financing. We expect that LDEBT should be positively 
correlated wi th CDPS. We also include last year's EPS into our explanatory 
variables because we consider that some companies with high earnings in year t-1 
pay cash dividends in year t when their earnings in year t is low. As a result, we 
expect that EPSt-1 and CDPS should be positively correlated. Furthermore, 
c o m p a n i e s in l a rge r s ize m a y h a v e h i g h e r probabi l i ty o f d i s t r i b u t i n g c a s h d i v i d e n d 
since they are stepping into mature stage in which they do not need huge external 
investment. So we expect that LSIZE and CDPS should be positively correlated. 
We run multiple regressions for mixed companies, state-owned shares controlled 
^^companies, legal entity shares controlled companies and tradable shares controlled 
State-owned shareholding percentage exceeds 50%. The same for legal entity shares controlled 
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companies. The regression result is shown as fo l lowing: 
Table 24 Regression result for year 1995 to 2002 (CDPS as dependent variable) 
Variable Expected M ixed State-owned Legal entity Tradable 
sign samples controlled controlled controlled 
95-02 95-02 95-02 95-02 
Intercept -0.144 -0.224 -0.134 -4.06E-02 
( -4 .86)** * ( -3 .36)*** (1.66)* (-0.41) 
SOS + 2.29E-02 0.129 1.98E-02 0.121 
(1.92)** (2 .90)*** (0.79) (2.39)** 
LES + 2.87E-02 0.101 4.32E-02 0.117 
(2 .39)*** (1.67)* (0.79) (2.08)** 
^ - -1.57E-02 2.30E-02 -0.112 -6.65E-03 
(-1.27) (0.62) ( -2.27)** (-0.13) 
L C A S H + 1.44E-02 2.02E-02 4.10E-03 1.92E-02 
(3 .26)*** (2.38)** (0.45) (1.44) 
LDP + 1.23E-02 5.55E-02 1.50E-03 -1.81E-02 
(1.54) (3 .60)*** (0.08) (-0.89) 
L D E B T + 8.81E-03 2.67E-02 7.08E-03 -2.02E-02 
(0.92) (1.37) (0.35) (-0.70) 
LS IZE + 9.44E-04 -5.18E-02 1.84E-02 1.48E-02 
(0.06) (-1.60) (0.50) (0.33) 
EPSt + 0.134 0.157 0.121 0.131 
(10.82)*** (7 .54)*** (4 .21)*** (3 .25)*** 
EPSt-1 + 2.33E-02 -2.62E-02 6.33E-02 0.108 
(2.32)** (-1.67)* (2.75)*** (2.88)*** 
Adj-R^ 0.132 0.173 0.138 0.200 
F-test 51 .27AAA 22 .0AAA 13.15AAA 7 .14AAA 
D - W test 1.934 1.940 1.894 2.013 
Observations 2985 905 682 222 一 
Notes: 
1. number in brackets is t-statistics 
2 * Two trial t-test, significant at 0.1 level; ** Two trial t-test. significant at 0.05 level; * * * 
and tradable shares controlled companies. 54 
Two trial t-test, significant at 0.01 level. 
3. • • F-test, significant at 0.05 level; • • • F-test’ significant at 0.01 level. 
From Table 24 reveals, wi thin 4 groups o f samples, state-owned shares and legal 
entity shares are positively correlated with cash dividend per share in statistical 
significance. It indicates that the higher percentage o f state-owned shares and legal 
entity shares is, the higher cash dividend per share is. So we prove that state-owned 
s h a r e h o l d e r s a n d legal en t i t y s h a r e h o l d e r s p r e f e r cash d i v i d e n d s a n d w e a c c e p t 
hypothesis 1. 
Wi th in 4 groups o f samples excluding state-owned controlled, tradable shares are 
negatively correlated wi th cash dividend per share. The group o f legal entity shares 
reveals such relationship especially significant. The t-statistics for this group is -2.27 
which is significant at 0.05 level. It indicates that the higher percentage o f tradable 
shares is, the lower cash dividend per share is. So we prove that tradable 
shareholders do not prefer cash dividends and we accept hypothesis 2. 
As we expected, monetary fund and cash dividend are positively correlated. Within 
mixed samples group, the t-statistics is significant at 0.01 level. It shows that the 
more monetary fund listed company has, the higher their cash dividend distribution 
is. 
We also f ind that within 4 groups of samples excluding tradable shares controlled, 
the coefficients of debt balance are positive. It shows that listed companies' debt 
balance is positively correlated with cash dividend distribution level. So we prove 
the possibility that China listed companies may distribute cash dividend out o f debt 
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financing. 
Within 4 groups o f samples, all adjusted R^ are higher than 0.13, indicating that our 
m o d e l s h o w s g o o d n e s s o f f i t , explanatory var iable can we l l e x p l a i n d e p e n d e n t 
variable. F-statistics are all significant at 0.01 levels, indicating that our model 
shows significant linear relationship. D-W statistics are very close to 2, indicating 
our model has no serial correlation and proving the validity o f OLS. Thus our 
empirical result is relatively reliable. 
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5.3 Empirical study of "no cash dividend disbursement" phenomenon 
Before year 2000, less and less companies disbursed cash dividends. The situation is 
improved at the end o f year 2000 due to Chinese authorities' effort to make cash 
dividend disbursement a r igid rule for refinancing. One o f possible reasons why 
many China listed companies are not w i l l ing to distribute cash dividends, we think, 
is the unreasonable ownership structure. Most China listed companies are 
restructured state-owned companies who are always controlled exclusively by 
state-owned shareholders. State-owned shareholders can decide the dividend pol icy 
beneficial for themselves through their absolute control over voting power. 
In this part, we use Logi t multiple regression model to analyze the phenomenon o f 
"no cash dividend disbursements" during year 1995 to year 1999. We exclude year 
2000 to 2002 observations because year 2000 regulation affected some listed 
companies' earning distribution behavior. The relationship between the probabil i ty 
of d i s t r i bu t ing c a s h d i v i d e n d s and o w n e r s h i p s t ruc tu re m a y no t b e o b v i o u s in pe r iod 
2000 to 2002. 
The regression model is as fol lowing: 
log = a + B ^ O S . ^ + 巧LESit + A T S It + ^ ^ L C A S H ^ 
1 - P i ‘ “ 
+ ^^DEBT^^ + /S^LSIZE^^ + ^EPS^^ + y5pEPS、t-i+ ^ 
The definit ion o f respective variables in the above regression model is shown in the 
fo l lowing Table. 
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Table 25 Defini t ion of variables in the regression model 
Variable Expected Definit ion 
^ 
Dependent P Probability o f distributing CD, P=1 means 
Var distribution, P=0 means no distribution 
Explanatory SOS - % of state-owned shares 
Var LES - % of legal entity shares (within borders) 
TS + % of tradable A share 
L C A S H + Common logarithm of monetary fund 
LDP + Natural logarithm of distributable profits 
LDEBT + Common logarithm of debt balance 
LSIZE + Common logarithm of total assets ( we use 
total assets to measure size) 
EPS + Earning per share 
We use maximum likelihood to estimate this set of parameters. Our empirical result 
is s h o w n in t h e f o l l o w i n g t ab le : 
Table 26 Regression result (1995 -1999) 
Variable Expected Mixed samples State-owned Legal entity 
sign controlled controlled 
Intercept -0.768 1.637 1.752 
(-1.23) (1.29) (1.10) 
SOS - 0.732 -0.674 0.030 
(2.94)*** (-0.82) (0.02) 
LES + 0.727 4.361 -0.393 
(2.90)*** (2.99)*** (-0.37) 
+ -0.141 -2.332 -4.139 
(-0.56) (-3.24)*** (-4.08)*** 
LCASH + 0.249 0.427 0.133 
(2.72)*** (2.63)*** (0.77) 
LDP + -0.443 0.086 -0.711 
(-2.61)*** (0.29) (-1.89)** 
LDEBT + 0.303 0.370 -0.146 
(1.52) (1.03) (-0.38) 
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L S I Z E r + -0.156 -0.987 0.397 
(-0.47) (-1.61)* (0.56) 
EPSt + 5.272 5.580 4.342 
(14.62)*** (8 .94) * * * (6 .17 ) * * * 
EPSt-1 + -1.672 -2.060 -1.086 
(-6.30) ( -4 .48) * * * (2 .14)** 
L o g l ike l ihood -1830.770 -672.242 -422.618 
Observations 2985 905 682 
Notes: 
1. number in brackets is t-statistics 
2 * Two trial t-test, significant at 0.1 level; ** Two trial t-test, significant at 0.05 level; * * * 
Two trial t-test, significant at 0.01 level. 
3. • • F-test, significant at 0.05 level; • • • F-test, significant at 0.01 level. 
F rom Table 26，we f ind that wi thin mixed samples, the parameter estimators for 
state-owned shares and legal entity shares are positive in statistical significance. I t 
indicates that the higher is the state-owned shares and legal entity shares percentage, 
the higher is the probabil i ty o f distributing cash dividends. Similarly, the lower is the 
state-owned shares and legal entity shares percentage, the lower is the probabil i ty o f 
distributing cash dividends. With in state-owned controlled samples, the higher is the 
l ega l en t i ty s h a r e s p e r c e n t a g e , t he h i g h e r is t he p robab i l i t y o f d i s t r i b u t i n g c a s h 
dividends. Interestingly, wi th in legal entity shares controlled samples, the higher is 
the state-owned shares percentage, the higher is the probabil ity o f distributing cash 
dividends as well. We notice that within all 3 groups o f samples, tradable 
shareholders do no prefer distributing cash dividends. Within state-owned controlled 
and legal entity controlled samples, the estimators o f parameters for tradable shares 
are negative w i th significant t-statistics. So it indicates that wi thin state-owned 
controlled companies and legal entity controlled companies, the higher is the 
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percentage o f tradable shares, the higher is the probability o f not distributing cash 
dividends. So we prove, from statistical aspect, that China listed companies' cash 
dividend policy is mainly decided by controll ing shareholders (state-owned 
shareholders and legal entity shareholders). The higher is the holding percentage o f 
controll ing shareholders, the higher is the probability o f distributing cash dividends. 
As we have expected, the parameter estimators for monetary fund is positive in 
s ta t i s t i ca l s i g n i f i c a n c e w i t h i n m i x e d s a m p l e s a n d s t a t e - o w n e d c o n t r o l l e d s a m p l e s 
(the t-statistics are very significant on 0.01 level). It shows that the richer is the 
listed companies' monetary fund, the higher is the probability o f distributing cash 
dividends. We also f ind that the parameter estimators for EPS o f current year are 
positive in statistical significance (the t-statistics are very significant at 0.01 level). I t 
indicates that the more current earnings listed companies have, the higher is the 
probability o f distributing cash dividends. Similarly, the less current earnings listed 
companies have, the lower is the probability of distributing cash dividends. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions 
Our empirical study o f information content of China listed companies' cash dividend 
changes has the fo l lowing conclusions: 
1. Stock price has significant reaction towards cash dividend change announcement: 
cash dividend increases are accompanied with CAR increases, cash dividend 
decreases are accompanied wi th CAR decreases. After announcement o f changes 
in c a s h d i v i d e n d , s t o c k p r i ce no t on ly c h a n g e s in t h e s a m e d i r e c t i o n as c a s h 
dividend, but also in a certain proportion. Meanwhile, we f ind that such 
relationship is largely dependent on the direction of current earnings change. 
This f inding not only supports that China listed companies' cash dividend 
changes have information content, but also proves that China capital market 
hasn't reached semi-strong efficient yet. 
2. China listed companies' cash dividend changes convey information to the market, 
but the content o f such information is quite different from that in relatively 
mature market. The change in cash dividend of China listed companies does not 
give the information regarding the future earning ability o f the related companies, 
but only gives the information about the company's earning in the current year. 
3. According to other countries' experience, cash dividend policy should be 
pre-scheduled. From the finding that change in cash dividend o f China listed 
companies only gives the information about the company's earning in the current 
year, we conclude that China listed companies do not take cash dividend policy 
seriously. In other words, China listed companies do not have long-term plan 
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about cash dividend policy. 
4. Surplus-converted stock and equity financing are very popular in China. 
However the result o f this study shows that the announcement o f the 
surplus-converted stock plan or the equity financing plan produces no impact on 
t h e n o r m a l j u d g m e n t o f t he i n v e s t o r s o v e r t h e s ignal d e l i v e r e d b y t h e c h a n g e in 
cash dividend. 
Our study o f relationship between cash dividend and ownership structure has the 
fo l lowing conclusions: 
Our multiple regression result reveals that state-owned shares and legal entity shares 
are positively correlated with cash dividend distribution level; tradable shares are 
negatively correlated with cash dividend distribution level. We prove, from 
statistical point, that state-owned shareholders and legal entity shareholders prefer 
cash dividends; tradable shareholders prefer no cash dividends. However, this result 
seems inconsistent with our empirical research of cash dividends' information 
content: stock price tend to increase fol lowing cash dividend increase and vice versa. 
I f tradable shareholders do not prefer cash dividends, why market has positive 
reaction towards positive cash dividend announcements'^ Our explanation is that 
cash dividends have only short-term effect on stock price. As many supporters of 
signaling theory have said, it is not cash dividend itself but the information content 
(current earnings in China case) o f dividend policy influence share prices In the long 
run, such effect is not significant. So these two results are not paradox. 
We analyze, from listed companies' ownership structure aspect, the phenomenon o f 
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“no cash dividend distribution” before year 2000. We find that wi th in all samples, 
state-owned shares percentage and legal entity shares percentage are positively 
correlated wi th the probability o f distributing cash dividends. It reveals f rom 
statistical aspect that China listed companies' cash dividend distribution plan is 
mainly decided by controll ing shareholders. 
Ignorance o f "no cash dividend phenomenon" wi l l damage investors' confidence. 
Moreover, it is not beneficial for stableness and further development o f China 
security market. So it is very urgent to standardize listed companies' cash dividend 
distribution behavior. To deal wi th listed companies' ignorance o f return to 
shareholders, Chinese authorities have made cash dividend disbursement a r igid rule 
for refinancing: According to〈Instructions towards Issuing New Shares for Listed 
Companies>(2001) when processing refinancing application, the Examination 
Committee w i l l pay more attention to listed companies' cash dividend policy in their 
recent 3 consecutive years, especially to the ratio of cash dividend to distributable 
p r o f i t s a n d t h e r e a s o n s t a t ed by t h e b o a r d o f d i r e c t o r s f o r no t d i s t r i bu t ing d i v i d e n d s . 
We suggest that China authorities should have more strict regulations towards listed 
companies' information disclosure. Listed companies should be required to disclose 
their long-term cash dividend policy and use this policy to guide their earning 
distribution plan in the future years. Our objective is to make cash dividend be 
anticipatable and listed companies' cash dividend plan should be subject to public 
opinion's supervision. 
Moreover, the deep reason for the “no cash dividend distribution" phenomenon is 
imperfect corporate governance structure and unreasonable ownership structure o f 
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most listed companies in China. So we suggest decentralizing and improving 




Calculation of stock return 
S t o c k r e t u r n is c a l c u l a t e d as f o l l o w i n g : 
I , ^ ^ -
where Pi,t is c los ing pr ice at day t, Pi,t-i is c losing pr ice at day t-1. 
I f day t is ex-d is t r ibu t ion date, c losing pr ice o f day t should be adjusted as f o l l o w i n g : 
Pi,t' 二 Pi,t* (1 + r 1 +r2+r3)-r3 * p + C D 
where C D is cash d iv idend per share, r i is stock d iv idend rat io, r2 is 
s u r p l u s - c o n v e r t e d ra t io , r3 is r igh t o f f e r i n g ra t io and p is d e s c r i p t i o n f e e f o r r i gh t 
o f f e r i n g . 
Table lA Samples' p coefficients 
Stock code p coefficient Stock code (3 coefficient 
600620 0.98379 600623 1-038344 
600624 1.077054 600627 1-233459 
600629 1.161104 600631 1-082419 
6 0 0 6 3 4 1 . 1 1 8 4 2 2 6 0 0 6 3 6 1 . 0 8 5 8 0 9 
600638 1.003304 600639 1-030573 
600642 1.146745 600645 0.980631 
600648 0.832205 600650 0-971279 
600655 0.932458 600659 1-118052 
600661 1.013744 600662 1.014851 
600664 1.099137 600666 0.993906 
600668 1.065841 600672 1-043622 
600675 “ 1.010677 600676 0.911708 
600678 1.162014 600679 1-0271922 
600681 1.187128 600682 1.029665 
600684 1.061517 600692 1.011502 
600694 1.015672 600695 1-021005 
600696 1.104063 600697 1.172493 
600801 1.125758 600802 1-165041 
600805 1.011057 600806 1-189767 
65 
600808 1.039844 600809 1-218124 
600812 1.129208 600814 1-034431 
600815 1.146035 600817 0.962436 
600819 1.050411 600821 1-096255 
600822 1.038314 600823 0.971104 
600824 1.128009 600825 0.966372 
600827 0.976643 600829 1.053747 
600834 i .034263 600836 1-118974 
600840 0.932735 600841 1-017386 
600842 1.028721 600843 1.031388 
600845 1.065837 600846 1-039563 
600848 1.120187 600850 0.943521 
600851 0.981972 600853 1-141384 
600854 0.779249 600856 1-153102 
600857 0.942352 600861 1-108171 
600863 1.095967 600866 1-075707 
6 0 0 9 6 7 1 . 0 8 8 2 9 7 [_!： 
Table 2A Earnings increase group's C A R (Figure 4) 
AD>0, AE>0, AD>0, AE>0, AD<0, AE>0, AD<0, AE>0, 
A>mean AD<mean AD〉mean AD<mean 
day Jr AR CAR AR CAR AR CAR 
-30 -0.0032 -0.00315 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.00159 -0.00159 0.001977 0.001977 
-29 -0.003 -0.00613 0.00033 -7.2E-05 0.002868 0.001278 -0.0009 0.001077 
-28 0.00101 -0.00512 -0.0023 -0.00235 0.001541 0.002819 0.003231 0.004308 
-27 0.00055 -0.00456 0.00054 -0.00182 7.05E-05 0.00289 0.004203 0.008511 
-26 8.5E-05 -0.00448 -0.0026 -0.0044 -0.00026 0.00263 -0.00309 0.005421 
-25 0.00668 0.0022 0.00344 -0.00096 -0.004 -0.00137 0.000637 0.006058 
-24 0.00405 0.006247 -0.0034 -0.00432 -0.00203 -0.0034 -0.00323 0.002828 
-23 -0.0016 0,004657 -0.0012 -0.00549 -0.00274 -0.00614 -0.00478 -0.00195 
-22 -0.0003 0.004347 0.00363 -0.00186 0.006365 0.000225 -0.000437 -0.00239 
-21 0.00578 0.010123 0.00298 0.00111 -0.00301 -0.00279 -0.00095 -0.00334 
_20 - 0 . 0 0 0 9 0 . 0 0 9 2 4 3 - 0 . 0 0 5 3 - 0 . 0 0 4 1 8 0 . 0 0 2 2 2 4 - 0 . 0 0 0 5 6 0 . 0 0 9 8 8 6 0 . 0 0 6 5 4 7 
-19 0.00484 0.014087 0.00265 -0.00153 -0.00307 -0.00363 -0.00047 0.006077 
-18 -0.0002 0.013927 -0.0004 -0.00197 0.001039 -0.00259 -0.00235 0.003727 
-17 0.00585 0.019779 -0.003 -0.00497 -0.0018 -0.00439 0.004483 0.00821 
1 I I 1 1 J 1 ^ 
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-16 0.00434 0.024122 -0.0039 -0.00888 0.005678 0.001286 0.000955 0.009165 
-15 0.00522 0.029337 -0.002 -0.01088 0.00082 0.002106 -0.00112 0.008045 
-14 0.00709 0.03643 -0.0041 -0.01493 0.000846 0.002952 0.002631 0.010676 
-13 0.00133 0.03776 0.00782 -0.00711 -0.00261 0.000341 0.007557 0.018233 
-12 -0.0006 0.03713 0.0038 -0.00331 -0.0012 -0.00086 -0.00541 0.012823 
-11 -0.004 0.03313 -0.0011 -0.00438 0.002709 0.001851 -0.00264 0.010183 
-10 -0.0017 0.03144 0.00105 -0.00333 -0.0016 0.00025 0.007117 0.0173 
-9 -4E-05 0.031405 -0.0004 -0.00375 -0.00011 0.00014 0.0037 0.021 
-8 0.00999 0.041397 -0.001 -0.00472 0.002904 0.003045 0.000181 0.021181 
-7 - 0 . 0 0 6 7 0 . 0 3 4 7 4 7 0 . 0 0 3 2 4 - 0 . 0 0 1 4 9 - 0 . 0 0 0 2 6 0 . 0 0 2 7 8 5 0 . 0 0 4 1 3 5 0 . 0 2 5 3 1 6 
-6 -0.0026 0.032107 0.00533 0.00384 0.003881 0.006666 0.010674 0.03599 
_5 0 . 0 0 7 6 5 0 . 0 3 9 7 5 9 0 . 0 0 1 9 6 0 . 0 0 5 8 - 0 . 0 0 1 3 6 0 . 0 0 5 3 0 6 0 . 0 0 0 2 0 9 0 . 0 3 6 1 9 9 
_4 0 . 0 0 1 4 6 0 . 0 4 1 2 1 9 0 . 0 0 4 8 1 0 . 0 1 0 6 1 0 . 0 0 5 1 6 0 . 0 1 0 4 6 6 0 . 0 0 2 0 5 1 0 . 0 3 8 2 5 
_3 - 0 . 0 0 0 8 0 . 0 4 0 3 9 9 0 . 0 0 0 9 2 0 . 0 1 1 5 3 0 . 0 0 3 3 4 9 0 . 0 1 3 8 1 5 - 0 . 0 0 1 5 0 . 0 3 6 7 5 
-2 0.00378 0.044177 0.00095 0.01248 0.000444 0.014259 -0.00209 0.03466 
-1 0.0139 0.058075 0.00728 0.01975 -0.00257 0.011689 -0.00111 0.03355 
0 0 . 0 0 9 8 2 0 . 0 6 7 8 9 7 0 . 0 0 8 5 5 0 . 0 2 8 3 0 . 0 0 4 5 1 6 0 . 0 1 6 2 0 5 - 0 . 0 1 0 1 2 0 . 0 2 3 4 3 
1 0 . 0 1 9 8 9 0 . 0 8 7 7 8 4 - 0 . 0 0 1 8 0 . 0 2 6 4 9 0 . 0 0 1 3 1 1 0 . 0 1 7 5 1 6 0 . 0 0 0 9 2 9 0 . 0 2 4 3 5 9 
2 0 . 0 0 8 6 6 0 . 0 9 6 4 4 4 - 0 . 0 0 3 2 0 . 0 2 3 2 8 - 0 . 0 0 1 7 4 0 . 0 1 5 7 7 6 - 0 . 0 0 8 4 5 0 . 0 1 5 9 0 9 
3 0 . 0 1 1 1 8 0 . 1 0 7 6 2 8 -0.0041 0 . 0 1 9 2 2 - 0 . 0 0 4 1 7 0 . 0 1 1 6 0 6 - 0 . 0 0 1 0 6 0 . 0 1 4 8 4 9 
4 -0.0059 0.101768 -0.0075 0.01177 -0.00081 0.010796 0.002617 0.017466 
5 0 . 0 0 8 9 5 0 . 1 1 0 7 2 0 . 0 0 3 0 6 0 . 0 1 4 8 3 - 0 , 0 0 0 1 7 0 . 0 1 0 6 2 6 0 . 0 0 2 5 2 8 0 . 0 1 9 9 9 4 
6 - 0 . 0 0 4 6 0 . 1 0 6 1 2 0 . 0 0 0 3 6 0 . 0 1 5 1 9 - 0 . 0 0 3 2 8 0 . 0 0 7 3 4 6 0 . 0 0 2 3 8 4 0 . 0 2 2 3 7 8 
7 - 0 . 0 0 1 6 0 . 1 0 4 4 9 0 . 0 0 1 5 4 0 . 0 1 6 7 3 0 , 0 0 7 8 6 0 . 0 1 5 2 0 6 0 . 0 0 0 9 0 5 0 . 0 2 3 2 8 3 
8 0 . 0 0 7 7 2 0 . 1 1 2 2 1 2 0 . 0 0 3 7 1 0 . 0 2 0 4 4 0 . 0 0 4 7 1 7 0 . 0 1 9 9 2 3 - 0 . 0 0 0 2 6 0 . 0 2 3 0 2 3 
9 - 0 . 0 0 3 3 0 . 1 0 8 9 5 2 0.002 0 . 0 2 2 4 4 - 0 . 0 0 6 0 2 0 . 0 1 3 9 0 3 - 0 . 0 0 4 4 3 0 . 0 1 8 5 9 3 
1 0 0 . 0 0 6 9 4 0 . 1 1 5 8 8 7 - 0 . 0 0 1 3 0 . 0 2 1 1 8 - 0 . 0 0 1 9 2 0 . 0 1 1 9 8 3 -0.0021 0 . 0 1 6 4 9 3 
11 - 0 . 0 0 6 2 0 . 1 0 9 6 5 7 0 . 0 0 4 8 4 0 . 0 2 6 0 2 - 0 . 0 0 2 6 3 0 . 0 0 9 3 5 3 - 0 . 0 0 1 5 3 0 . 0 1 4 9 6 3 
12 -0.0041 0.105577 0.00562 0.03164 -0.00287 0.006483 -0.00307 0.011893 
1 3 0 . 0 0 0 5 5 0 . 1 0 6 1 3 1 0 . 0 0 3 7 1 0 . 0 3 5 3 5 - 0 . 0 0 3 2 5 0 . 0 0 3 2 3 3 - 0 . 0 0 6 8 4 0 . 0 0 5 0 5 3 
1 4 0 . 0 0 5 5 7 0 . 1 1 1 7 0 1 - 0 . 0 0 2 9 0 . 0 3 2 4 6 0 . 0 0 8 1 0 6 0 . 0 1 1 3 3 9 - 0 . 0 0 7 0 9 - 0 . 0 0 2 0 4 
1 5 0 . 0 0 6 2 6 0 . 1 1 7 9 5 7 -0.0014 0 . 0 3 1 0 7 0 . 0 0 2 9 9 2 0 . 0 1 4 3 3 1 - 0 . 0 0 6 2 - 0 . 0 0 8 2 4 
16 0.00735 0.125306 0.00283 0.0339 -0.0099 0.004431 -0.00641 -0.01465 
17 -0.0039 0.121436 0.00017 0.03407 -0.00083 0.003601 0.0054 -0.00925 
18 0.00079 0.122229 -0.0046 0.02952 -0.00317 0.000431 -0.00031 -0.00956 
1 9 0 . 0 0 4 1 9 0 . 1 2 6 4 1 9 0 . 0 0 1 4 6 0 . 0 3 0 9 8 0 . 0 0 8 7 9 7 0 . 0 0 9 2 2 8 0 . 0 0 6 7 4 5 - 0 . 0 0 2 8 1 
2 0 - 0 . 0 0 1 3 0 . 1 2 5 0 9 9 0 . 0 0 3 7 7 0 . 0 3 4 7 5 - 0 . 0 0 1 8 5 0 . 0 0 7 3 7 8 - 0 . 0 0 0 9 8 - 0 . 0 0 3 7 9 
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^ ” | o . 0 0 4 0 2 0.129114 0.00192 0.03667 0.001142 0.00852 -0.00737 -0.01116 
22 0.00999 0.139105 0.00183 0.03849 -0.00181 0,00671 -0.00604 -0.0172 
23 -0.0026 0.136505 -0.0036 0.03492 -0.00195 0.00476 0.005815 -0.01139 
24 0.0019 0.138407 -0.0007 0.0342 5.29E-05 0.004812 -0.01219 -0.02358 
25 -0.0024 0.135967 -0.0003 0.03387 0.004668 0,00948 -0.0027 -0.02628 
2 6 -0.001 0 . 1 3 4 9 2 7 - 0 . 0 0 0 3 0 . 0 3 3 5 8 - 0 . 0 0 1 2 6 0 . 0 0 8 2 2 - 0 . 0 0 4 4 9 - 0 . 0 3 0 7 7 
27 -0.0024 0.132487 -0.0008 0.03276 -0.00236 0.00586 -0.0072 -0.03797 
28 0.00287 0.135352 -0.0017 0.03111 -0.00944 -0.00358 0.001332 -0.03664 
29 -0.0049 0.130432 0.00364 0.03475 0.001877 -0.0017 -0.0046 -0.04124 
30 -0.0059 0.124502 0.00404 0.03879 -0.00116 -0.00286 -0.00954 -0.05078 
Table 3A Earn ings increase group's C A R (Figure 5) 
AD>0, AE<0, AD>0, AE<0, AD<0, AE<0, AD<0, AE<0, 
A>mean AD<mean AD<mean AD>mean 
day ^ AR CAR AR CAR AR CAR 
-30 -0.0087 -0.0087 -0.00389 -0.00389 -0,0035 -0.00346 -0.00116 -0.00116 
-29 0.00685 -0.00185 0.002226 -0.00166 0.00109 -0.00237 0.001264 0.000104 
-28 -0.0001 -0.00196 0.003663 0.001999 0.00158 -0.00079 -0.00127 -0.001166 
-27 0.00185 -0.00011 0.001747 0.003746 0.00175 0.00096 -0.00113 -0.002296 
-26 0.00066 0.000552 -0.00607 -0.00232 -0.0012 -0.00028 0.000543 -0.001753 
-25 0.00529 0.005843 -0.00284 -0.00516 -0.0028 -0.00306 0.000365 -0.001388 
_24 -0.0015 0.004333 0.002854 -0.00231 0.00048 -0.00258 -0.00026 -0.001648 
-23 0.00474 0.00907 0.000185 -0.00213 0.0035 0.00092 0.002904 0.001256 
-22 0.00429 0.013357 0.0069 0.004775 5.9E-05 0.00098 0.001993 0.003249 
-21 0.00098 0.014339 0.000783 0.005558 0.00065 0.00163 0.00353 0.006779 
-20 0.00772 0.02206 0.000548 0.006106 0.00035 0.00198 0.001787 0.008566 
-19 0.00352 0.02558 -0.00368 0.002426 -0,0039 -0.00193 0.001146 0.009712 
-18 0.00223 0.027812 0.000408 0.002834 -0.003 -0.00491 0.001194 0.010906 
-17 -0.0034 0.024372 0.003743 0.006577 -0.0012 -0,00611 0.001462 0.012368 
_16 -0.0054 0.018952 -0.0011 0.005477 0.00066 -0.00546 -0.00055 0.011818 
-15 -0.0091 0.009852 -0.00197 0.003507 0.00119 -0.00427 -0.00271 0.009108 
-14 0.00374 0.013588 0.0019 0.005407 0,0007 -0.00357 0.003169 0.012277 
_13 -0.0043 0.009258 0.002088 0.007495 -0.0017 -0.00522 0.001459 0.013736 
-12 0.00076 0.01002 0.007657 0.015152 -0.0003 -0.00547 -0.0007 0.013036 
0.0017 0.011717 0.000408 0.01556 -0.0001 -0.0056 0.002418 0.015454 
-10 0.00461 0.016328 0.00334 0.0189 -0.0011 -0.00674 0.000125 0.015579 
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-9 0.00455 0.020874 -0.00062 0.01828 0.00366 -0.00308 0.001244 0.016823 
-8 0.00055 0.021426 0.009346 0.027626 4.8E-05 -0.00303 -0.00201 0.014813 
-7 -0.0031 0.018356 -0.0036 0.024026 -0.0012 -0.0042 0.001894 0.016707 
-6 0.00218 0.020533 0.002693 0.026719 -0.0009 -0.00507 -0.00286 0.013847 
_5 0.00719 0.02772 -0.00359 0.023129 -0.0042 -0.00926 0.003688 0.017535 
-4 -0.0072 0.02048 0.000715 0.023844 0.00171 -0.00755 -0.0013 0.016235 
-3 -0.0083 0.01216 0.00075 0.024594 -0.0025 -0.01002 -0.0018 0.014435 
_2 0.00091 0.01307 -0.00366 0.020934 -0.0016 -0.01164 -0.00552 0.008915 
_1 -0.0041 0.00895 0.000125 0.021059 -0.0027 -0.01438 -0.00944 -0.000525 
0 -0.0018 0.00716 -0.0014 0.019659 -0.0265 -0.04091 -0.00787 -0.008395 
1 -0.0065 0.00066 0.002083 0.021742 -0.0056 -0.04652 -0.00631 -0.014705 
2 0.0009 0.00156 -0.00656 0.015182 -0.0079 -0.05445 -0.00125 -0.015955 
3 0.00923 0.01079 -0.00432 0.010862 -0.0034 -0.05788 -0.0021 -0.018055 
4 0.00144 0.01223 0.000347 0.011209 -0,0039 -0.06174 -0.00108 -0.019135 
5 0.00383 0.016058 -0.00126 0.009949 0.00049 -0.06126 -0.0002 -0.019335 
6 0.00802 0.024077 0.005977 0.015926 -0.0002 -0.06146 -0.00136 -0.020695 
7 -0.0057 0.018337 0.004243 0.020169 -0.0028 -0.06422 -0.00368 -0.024375 
8 0.00772 0.026058 -0.00036 0.019809 0.00057 -0.06365 -0.00196 -0.026335 
9 0.00458 0.030634 -0.00388 0.015929 0.00014 -0.06351 0.003448 -0.022887 
^ 0 . 0 2 5 2 2 0.055854 -0.00156 0.014369 0.00057 -0.06293 -0.00336 -0.026247 
11 -0.0036 0.052234 -0.00651 0.007859 -0.0018 -0.06472 0.000766 -0.025481 
^ “ ― 0 . 0 0 6 3 2 0.058556 0.004972 0.012831 0.00209 -0.06264 0.001581 -0.0239 
^ . 0 . 0 0 1 4 0.057146 -0.00611 0.006721 0.00274 -0.0599 -0.00034 -0.02424 
-0.0002 0.056996 -0.00259 0.004131 -0.0019 -0.06183 0.000298 -0.023942 
^ _ 0 . 0 0 0 9 0.056066 -0.00618 -0.00205 -0.0024 -0,06419 -0.00204 -0.025982 
-0.0045 0.051546 0.005317 0.003268 0.00113 -0.06306 -0.00174 -0.027722 
- 0 . 0 1 3 8 0 . 0 3 7 7 8 6 - 0 . 0 0 9 7 7 - 0 . 0 0 6 5 - 0 . 0 0 1 9 - 0 . 0 6 4 9 4 0 . 0 0 0 3 8 9 - 0 . 0 2 7 3 3 3 
18 -0.0032 0.034596 -0.00589 -0.01239 -0.0013 -0.06628 -0.00252 -0.029853 
19 0.00555 0.040145 0.003715 -0.00868 0.00083 -0.06545 -0.00513 -0.034983 
20 7.4E-05 0.040219 -0.00357 -0.01225 6.4E-05 -0.06539 0.002981 -0.032002 
21 -0.0014 0.038839 0.002517 -0.00973 -0.0006 -0.06595 -0.00256 -0.034562 
22 -0.0051 0.033709 -0.01014 -0,01987 -0,0049 -0.07083 -0.00283 -0.037392 
23 -0.0081 0.025569 0.008001 -0.01187 -0.0028 -0.07367 -0.00337 -0.040762 
24 0.002 0.027565 0.004662 -0.00721 -0.0045 -0.07814 -0.00371 -0.044472 
25 0.00763 0.035199 -0.00375 -0.01096 0.0033 -0.07484 -0.00106 -0.045532 
26 -0.0083 0.026889 -0.00278 -0.01374 -0.0039 -0.07878 0.00092 -0.044612 
27 -0 0019 0.024999 -0.00685 -0.02059 0.00379 -0,07499 -0.00389 -0.048502 L 1 
69 
28 0.0026 0.027602 0.006016 -0.01457 -0.0073 -0.0823 -0.00559 -0.054092 
29 -0.0134 0.014162 0.004359 -0.01021 -0.0093 -0.09158 -0.00464 -0.058732 
30 0.00343 0.017589 -0.00568 -0.01589 -0.0032 -0.09475 0.000183 -0.058549 
Table 4A C A R for observations without surplus-converted stock and right offering 
(Figure 6 and Figure 7) 
AD〉0’ AE>0 AD<0, AE>0 AD>0, AE<0 AD<0’ AE<0 
day ^ AR CAR AR CAR m CAR 
-30 -0.00117 -0.00117 -0.00291 -0,00291 -0.00596 -0,00596 -0.00201 -0.00201 
-29 5.69E-05 -0.001113 0.000892 -0.00202 0.001742 -0.004218 0.001482 -0.00053 
-28 - 0 . 0 0 4 0 5 - 0 . 0 0 5 1 6 3 0.000346 -0.00167 0.003157 -0.001061 -0.00029 -0.00082 
0.003802 -0.001361 0.001692 2E-05 -0.0016 -0.002661 0.000713 - 0 . 0 0 0 ” 
_26 -0.00014 -0.001501 -0.00165 -0.00163 -0.00234 -0.005001 -0.00075 -0.00086 
-25 0.006516 0.005015 -0.00149 -0.00312 0.001464 -0.003537 -0.00072 -0.00158 
-24 -0.00315 0.001865 -0.00443 -0.00755 -0.00116 -0.004697 -5.9E-05 -0.00163 
-23 -0.000017 0.001848 -0.00058 -0.00813 0.003503 -0.001194 0.002325 0.000691 
-22 0.0049 0.006748 0.001441 -0.00669 0.00451 0.003316 0.001272 0.001963 
-21 0.002891 0.009639 -0.00223 -0.00892 0.003522 0.006838 0.002575 0.004538 
-20 -0 0 0 1 4 8 0 008159 0.004463 -0.00446 0.003863 0.010701 0.001819 0.006357 
-19 0.005101 0.01326 -0.00267 -0.00713 -0.00204 0.008661 -0.0002 0.006157 
-18 0 . 0 0 0 7 0 1 0 . 0 1 3 9 6 1 0.001334 -0.00579 0.001437 0.010098 -0.00085 0.005307 
-17 0.002241 〇.016202 -0.00071 -0.0065 0.001049 0.011147 0.000356 0.005663 
-16 - 0 . 0 0 0 7 5 “ ― 0 . 0 1 5 4 5 2 0.004199 -0.0023 -0,0015 0.009647 0.000195 0.005858 
-15 0 . 0 0 0 3 4 8 0 . 0 1 5 8 -0.00194 -0.00424 -0.00682 0.002827 -0.0015 0.004358 
-14 0.000566 0.016366 0.000343 -0.0039 0.002691 0.005518 0.001991 0.006349 
-13 0 . 0 0 4 8 1 8 0 . 0 2 1 1 8 4 0.001155 -0.00275 -0.00054 0,004978 0.000609 0.006958 
-12 0.005904 0.027088 -0.0012 -0.00395 0.003582 0.00856 0.000643 0.007601 
-11 0.001263 0.028351 0.000057 -0.00389 0.000439 0.008999 0.001114 0.008715 
-10 -0.00191 ^ 0 . 0 2 6 4 4 1 0.001793 -0.0021 0.002458 0.011457 -0.0003 0.008415 
0.000799 0.02724 0.000823 -0.00127 0.001126 0.012583 0.002213 0.010628 
0 . 0 0 5 6 7 0 . 0 3 2 9 1 0.002948 0.001676 0.006822 0.019405 -0.00159 0.009038 
“ - 0 . 0 0 0 2 3 0.03268 0.002524 0.0042 -0.00175 0.017655 -9.6E-05 0.008942 
“ 0 . 0 0 3 9 8 5 0.036665 0.003587 0.007787 0.003016 0.020671 -0.00297 0.005972 
-5 0.008668 0.045333 -0.00089 0.006897 5.37E-05 0.020725 -0.00033 0.005642 
^ 0 . 0 0 6 8 3 2 0 . 0 5 2 1 6 5 0 . 0 0 1 5 7 9 0 . 0 0 8 4 7 6 -0.00491 0 . 0 1 5 8 1 5 - 0 . 0 0 0 4 3 0 . 0 0 5 2 1 2 
-3 0 006379 0.058544 0.00141 0.009886 -0,00186 0.013955 -0.00252 0.002692 
70 
^ | o . 0 0 3 2 2 4 0.061768 -0.00084 0.009046 -0.00415 0.009805 -0.00581 -0.00312 
0.014197 0.075965 -0.0024 0.006646 -0.00012 0.009685 -0.00716 -0.01028 
0 0.013704 0.089669 -0.00117 0.005476 -0.00035 0.009335 -0.01585 -0.02613 
1 0.001727 0.091396 0.001184 0.00666 -0.00395 0.005385 -0.00674 -0.03287 
2“―-0.00345 0.087946 -0.00542 0.00124 -0.00205 0.003335 -0.00498 -0.03785 
3“―-0.00231 0.085636 -0.00232 -0.00108 0.00184 0.005175 -0.0035 -0.04135 
4 - 0 . 0 0 3 2 6 0.082376 -0.0003 -0.00138 0.002277 0.007452 -0.00295 -0.0443 
5 0 . 0 0 3 5 0 9 0.085885 0.002967 0.001587 0.002124 0.009576 0.001384 -0.04291 
6 - 0 . 0 0 2 4 1 0 . 0 8 3 4 7 5 0.001817 0.003404 0.007193 0.016769 -0.00147 -0.04438 
7 0 . 0 0 4 3 8 6 0.087861 0.007144 0.010548 0.000405 0.017174 -0.00358 -0.04796 
8 0 . 0 0 1 3 7 1 ^ 0 . 0 8 9 2 3 2 -0.0018 0.008748 0.000959 0.018133 -0.00024 -0.0482 
9 - 0 . 0 0 2 7 1 0.086522 -0.0049 0.003848 -0.0008 0.017333 0.001852 -0.04635 
10 - 0 . 0 0 0 7 4 0 . 0 8 5 7 8 2 -0.00239 0.001458 0.012864 0.030197 -0.00249 -0.04884 
11 -0.00048 0.085302 -0.00291 -0.00145 -0.00513 0.025067 -0.00131 -0.05015 
12 0.004393 0.089695 -0.00106 -0.00251 0.006081 0.031148 0.001863 -0.04829 
13 0.006642 0.096337 -0.00368 -0.00619 -0.0034 0.027748 0.001115 -0.04717 
14 0.001785 0.098122 0.004299 -0.00189 -0.00247 0.025278 -0.00105 -0.04822 
15 0.002554 0.100676 -0.00355 -0.00544 -0.00377 0.021508 -0.00386 -0.05208 
16 0.004931“―0.105607 -0.0089 -0.01434 0.001621 0.023129 -0.00042 -0.0525 
17 0.002403 0.10801 0.003039 -0.0113 -0.01238 0.010749 -0.00113 -0.05363 
18 -0.00242 0.10559 -0.00278 -0.01408 -0.00539 0.005359 -0.00174 -0.05537 
19 0.000551 0.106141 0.007007 -0.00708 0.001995 0.007354 -0.00256 -0.05793 
20 -0.00022 0.105921 -0.00487 -0.01195 -0.00369 0.003664 0.002427 -0.05551 
21 0.003812 0.109733 -0.00193 -0.01388 0.000968 0.004632 -0.00266 -0.05817 
2 2 0 . 0 0 5 6 4 7 ~ 0 . 1 1 5 3 8 - 0 . 0 0 9 6 3 - 0 . 0 2 3 5 1 - 0 , 0 1 0 9 6 - 0 . 0 0 6 3 2 8 - 0 . 0 0 4 1 3 - 0 . 0 6 2 3 
23 0.000681“―0.116061 0.001577 -0.02193 0.002271 -0.004057 -0.00424 -0.06654 
24 0.000708 0.116769 -0.00565 -0.02758 0.001866 -0.002191 -0.0052 -0.07174 
25 -0 .00176 “―0 .115009 -0.00023 -0.02781 -0.00077 -0.002961 0.001714 -0.07002 
26 -0.0009 0.114109 -0.00184 -0.02965 -0.004 -0.006961 -0.00164 -0.07166 
27 0.002927 0.117036 -0.00814 -0.03779 -0.00627 -0.013231 -0.00093 -0.07259 
28 -0.00169 0.115346 -0.00559 -0.04338 0.007299 -0.005932 -0.00695 -0.07954 
29 0.004038 0.119384 -0.0019 -0.04528 0.000215 -0.005717 -0.00751 -0.08705 
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